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Abstract
This thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter explains the relevance of the
research that has been undertaken and it contains an overview of this research for a general
audience. The second chapter studies a multi-unit assignment with endogenous quotas in
a dichotomous preference domain. The main conclusion I obtain is that pseudo-market
mechanisms perform poorly in this type of environment.
The third and fourth chapters use matching theory to understand segregation in
matching environments ranging from integrating kidney exchanges platforms to the increase
in interracial marriages after the popularization of online dating platforms. In both
Chapters, using different formulations, I show under which conditions social integration
can be obtained.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Economics can be described as the systematic study of how to allocate scarce resources to
a group of heterogeneous individuals. If we are interested in allocating those resources
efficiently, we would give them to the persons who value them most. If we are interested
in distributing them fairly instead, we should procure that every agent is relatively happy
with the number of goods they obtain compared to what other persons get. Both ideas
have been formalised in economics: efficiency as the maximisation of a social welfare
function, and fairness as a no-envy test, that requires that each person receives a bundle
of items that they value as much as the one received by any of their peers.
Luckily, when dividing scarce resources, we can generally find allocations that are
efficient and fair by using prices: agents are endowed with budgets, and spend their
endowments rationally. The division produced is always efficient and envy-free: agents
spend their money on the goods they value most, and nobody envies the assignment
obtained by someone else because they could have afforded it but instead choose another
bundle in their budget set. My thesis studies how to find fair and efficient allocations
whenever prices cannot be used. This type of problem is referred in the literature as a
matching problem.
Matching problems have been extensively studied because economists and mathemati-
cians realised that there are practical situations in which pricing scarce resources is either
considered disgusting or unfeasible. Examples include using prices to allocate organs for
transplantation, like kidneys or lungs, seats in public schools, or online dating partners.
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The economics discipline understood that these assignment environments were in practice
very distinct from markets, and thus deserved a systematic study on their own.
However, because of very different reasons, we as a community started studying those
matching problems in the same way we studied markets and employing the same techniques.
An example is the competitive equilibrium mechanism with equal incomes. The way it
works is that we do not use prices but create a fake currency instead so that it is the
market designer, and not the agents through their interaction, who finds the equilibrium
allocations. Agents are asked what they would consume for every combination of prices,
then the market designer computes an allocation, and informs each player of their bundle
received at such prices. The take away from this literature is that pseudo-market methods
work well: they are envy-free and Pareto efficient, and furthermore are non-manipulable
whenever there are many agents interacting with each other.
The first contribution of my thesis is to show that pseudo-market mechanisms sometimes
do not work as well as we may expect, producing outcomes that are neither fair nor hard
to manipulate. In Chapter 2, I show that market mechanisms perform poorly in the case
of multi-unit assignment, a fair division problem in which every person can receive several
goods. By poorly I mean that
1. market mechanisms are unfair,
2. market mechanisms are not single-valued, and
3. market mechanisms can be manipulated by groups.
Surprisingly, we can use a Rawlsian type of mechanism that avoids all those problems
present in the competitive equilibrium mechanism. Even more surprisingly, while the
competitive mechanism is used in applications, I am unaware that the Rawlsian or leximin
mechanism has ever been applied in practice.
Chapters 3 and 4 use matching models to understand segregation: i.e. understanding
which are the real-life restrictions that make partners of the same race match among
themselves in a much higher proportion than they match with people from other races.
2
In Chapter 3, I consider the following problem: individuals belong to different com-
munities, and match among themselves. How many people prefer to match as a unified
community instead? I am interested in this type of problem because economics has pro-
vided a rationale for behavioural patterns we encounter frequently in human interactions:
envy, altruism, and cooperation are all words often used in the game-theoretic literature.
What I attempt to do is to provide a theoretical framework to understand why some
people may oppose social integration, and what characteristics those people theoretically
share.
I show that there is no way to integrate isolated communities that guarantee that
every agent is better off after integration occurs, as long as integration produces either
an efficient or a Pareto optimal pairing. Remarkably, this is true even for large societies:
computational simulations show that with five or fewer societies, the number of agents
that become worse off after integration occurs remains around 25 percent of the society
as a whole. It is also surprising that those agents who get hurt by social integration are
indistinguishable in terms of expected ranking of any other agent.
Finally, Chapter 4 presents a Schelling-type model that explains how people marry.
The idea behind it is simple: people want to marry other agents that have personality
traits close to theirs. However, a person can only marry another person who they know,
so being poorly connected to people of other races would inevitably yield a low rate of
interracial marriages.
However, online dating often allows us to meet people who would otherwise be complete
strangers to us, breaking an old phenomenon in networks usually referred as the strength
of weak ties. But how much do those new ties through social networks will influence the
decision of who do we end up marrying? We combine the tools of stable matching with
those from random graph theory to answer this question with an unexpected result: even
with a small number of new edges in a generalized random graph, the number of interracial
marriages present in a society increases dramatically. We contrast our theory against the
existing data on interracial marriages in the U.S., and find that our results are in line with
current demographic trends.
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In this last model, which has benefited from the collaboration with Philipp Hergovich
from the University of Vienna, real life restrictions in matching strike again. Our results
show that those absent ties or edges in a random graph make an important difference, and
suggest that the actual ethnic composition of marriages in our societies may not be owing
to intraracial preferences but could arise solely by social networks restrictions.
What should be taken away from this idea, then, is that in order to gain a proper
understanding of how matching environments without money work, we need to detect the
key aspects of each environment. These then need to be captured within our theoretical
models, instead of forcing the use of solutions to different problems to our new environments.
Matching environments are quite different from markets, and our understanding of them
will be more profound as we become able to capture that difference in our research.
4
Chapter 2
The Random Multi-Unit Assignment
Problem with Endogenous Quotas
Abstract
We study the random multi-unit assignment problem in which the number of
goods to be distributed depends on players’ preferences.
In this setup, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive
equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in
utilities, and impossible to manipulate by groups when agents have dichotomous
preferences. Moreover, it can be adapted to satisfy a new fairness axiom that
arises naturally in this context. Both solutions are disjoint.
Two standard results disappear. The competitive solution can no longer be
computed with the Eisenberg-Gale program maximizing the Nash product,
and the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes is no longer unique in its
corresponding utility profile.
KEYWORDS: multi-unit assignment, random assignment, endogenous quotas,
dichotomous preferences, fair division, scheduling, course allocation, tennis.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D63 (equity, justice, inequality), C78 (matching theory).
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2.1 Our Problem and its Relevance
Consider a tennis club organizer who has to assign double tennis matches. He knows the
players self-reported availability over the weekdays, and tries to find a reasonable schedule
such that 1) no person plays on a day she is not available, 2) no person plays more than
once per day, and 3) each match has exactly four players.
The previous assignment problem can be described by a matrix containing players’
availability and a quota indicating how many players are required to create a game (four
for our tennis example). Table 2.1 presents a real-life example from Maher (2016), in
which two games of four people each can be created on both Tuesday and Thursday, one
game on both Monday and Wednesday, and zero games on Friday, when less than four
players are available.
Table 2.1: A tennis problem with a deterministic solution in parenthesis.
Players \ Days Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Total
Barry 0 0 1 (1) 1 (1) 0 2 (2)
Tom 1 (0) 1 (1) 0 1 (1) 0 3 (2)
Peter 1 (1) 1 (1) 0 0 0 2 (2)
Colin 1 (1) 0 0 1 (1) 0 2 (2)
Mike 0 1 (1) 1 (0) 1 (1) 1 (0) 4 (2)
Keith 0 1 (0) 1 (1) 0 0 2 (1)
Alan 1 (0) 0 0 1 (1) 0 2 (1)
John 0 1 (1) 0 0 0 1 (1)
Ringo 1 (1) 0 1 (1) 0 0 2 (2)
George 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (1) 0 4 (1)
Michael 0 0 1 (1) 0 0 1 (1)
Phil 0 1 (1) 0 0 0 1 (1)
Brian 1 (1) 1 (1) 0 0 0 2 (2)
Paul 0 1 (1) 0 1 (1) 0 2 (2)
Willie 0 0 0 1 (1) 0 1 (1)
Ken 0 1 (1) 0 0 0 1 (1)
Total 7 (4) 10 (8) 6 (4) 8 (8) 1 (0)
The scheduling problem above is representative of a large class of multi-unit assign-
ment problems where the number of available resources depends on agents’ preferences.
Other examples include scheduling teamwork, distributing provisions to food banks, lung
6
transplantation or allocating courses to students. We describe them in detail in the next
subsection.
For such assignment problems, we would like to have a systematic procedure to decide
fairly which players should get which games, that at the same time incentivize players to
reveal truthfully their availability.
Our contribution is to propose an egalitarian solution that achieves this purpose for a
wide class of multi-unit assignment problems in the dichotomous preference domain.
The egalitarian solution is based on the well-known leximin principle, and performs
better than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes solution, which is theoretically
appealing in similar assignment models (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979; Budish, 2011) and
has been successfully applied in practice to allocate courses in business schools (Budish
et al., 2017). By better, we mean that the egalitarian solution is, unlike the pseudo-market
solution, Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and impossible to manipulate by groups.
Lorenz dominance is “a ranking generally accepted as the unambiguous arbiter of
inequality comparison” (Foster and Ok, 1999) and is “widely accepted as embodying a
set of minimal ethical judgments that should be made” (Dutta and Ray, 1989). Given
two vectors of size n, the first one Lorenz dominates the second one if, when arranged in
ascending order, the sum of the first k ≤ n elements of the first one is always greater or
equal than the sum of the k first elements of the second one. A utility profile is Lorenz
dominant is it Lorenz dominates any other feasible utility profile.
In our setup, that a utility profile is Lorenz dominant implies that it uniquely maximizes
any strictly concave utility function representing players’ preferences, like the Nash product,
and is, therefore, a strong fairness property.
Uniqueness of the solution (in the utility profile obtained) is also a very desirable
property, for it gives a clear recommendation of how the resources should be split. A
multi-valued solution leaves the schedule designer with the complicated task of selecting a
particular division among those suggested by the solution, thus raising the opportunity
of rightful complaints by some agents, who may argue that there were other allocations
recommended by the solution that were more beneficial to them.
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It is equally interesting that the egalitarian solution is not manipulable by groups,
implying that coalitions of players can never profit from misrepresenting their availability,
not even when reducing the total number of resources created. The competitive solution is
manipulable by groups in our setup, as in many others. Yet, it is remarkable that even in
our small dichotomous preference domain, where possibilities to misreport are very limited,
the pseudo-market solution can still be manipulated. Manipulating a solution can be done
easily, by groups reducing their availability strategically on days where the demand for
resources almost equals its supply.
The fact that the egalitarian solution satisfies these three desirable properties is a strong
argument for recommending its use in this environment, instead of the pseudo-market
mechanism. The egalitarian solution also satisfies these three properties in the multi-unit
assignment problem with exogenous quotas, for which other solutions have been proposed
in the literature, but for which the egalitarian solution has not yet been considered.
Throughout the article, we stick to the tennis jargon and denote by generalized tennis
problems (GTPs) the set of random multi-unit assignment problems with endogenous
quotas and dichotomous preferences. GTPs include several real-life problems, which we
discuss below.
2.1.1 Applications
GTPs are motivated by the real-life allocation of tennis slots to players, which can be
generalized to other sports (the quota required to create one game could be 2 for tennis
singles, 22 for football, etcetera) but include several other problems in which the number
of goods to be assigned depends on agents’ preferences or characteristics. Some of them
are:
1. Scheduling team work. Scheduling is an intuitive example that fits the dichotomous
preference domain. Consider the scheduling problem faced by airlines, whose flights need
a specific number of cabin crew members required by law, or the one faced by policemen
who need to be in groups of certain size to patrol in some area. Other examples of this
kind can be constructed.
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2. Allocation of provisions to food banks. Food banks distribute provisions to people in
need, which in turn they receive from large storage centers. A food bank may need a specific
type of meal, but it is often impractical to ship a whole truckload from a distribution
center to serve only a small food bank. Therefore, shipments from the storage centers can
only be sent whenever a specific number of food banks request one (see Section 3.1 in
Prendergast, 2017, also Aleksandrov et al., 2015).
3. Organ Exchange. Dichotomous preferences have been used to model whether a person
is compatible or not with a particular organ for transplantation. Roth et al. (2005) write
“the experience of American surgeons suggests that preferences over kidneys can be well
approximated as 0 - 1, i.e. that patients and surgeons should be more or less indifferent
among kidneys from healthy donors that are blood type and immunologically compatible
with the patient”.
In particular, a (living donor lobar) lung transplant requires two compatible donors to be
succesfully performed, each giving a lower lung lobe to the patient (Cohen et al., 2014;
Ergin et al., 2017).1 The problem of organizing lung transplantation can be formulated
as a compatibility matrix, in which rows represents hospitals, and columns denote types
of compatible donors available. Note that even though the entries of the matrix can be
larger than 1, the problem is equivalent to ours as it will be seen in our Examples. Each
row becomes a “large” agent, whose compatibility is the sum of several individual 0-1
compatibility entries.
4. Course Allocation. Our problem is also similar to the real-life allocation of courses or
tutorials in Universities. The number of seats available for each course is not entirely fixed,
as Universities are able to open new courses if the demand for a course is significantly
larger than its supply. For example, if the maximum number of students for a course is 50,
and there are 125 students willing to take it, the University is likely to open two of such
courses so 100 students can be served. Opening courses to fit the supply particularly fits
1A healthy person has five lung lobes: three in the right one, two in the left one. Given that the rows
represent hospitals, it is unlikely that their constraints on the number of transplantation procedures they
can perform are binding, as currently lung transplantation is rare. In the UK, only 198 were carried out
in 2013-14, none of those in Scotland. Source: “Lung transplant”, NHS, 28/06/2016.
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the case of tutorials or recitation sessions, because these are usually taught by graduate
students which tend to be easy to hire.2
There is a subtle difference, however, as students may have horizontal constraints on the
maximum number of courses they can take. Including this type of constraints makes our
problem much more difficult to solve, so we postpone its discussion to Section 7.
2.1.2 Related Literature
Our theoretical model is closely related to three existing problems in the literature:
1. Single-unit random assignment with dichotomous preferences by Bogomolnaia and
Moulin (2004), henceforth BM04. Our model generalizes theirs in two regards. Firstly, in
their setup agents can only get one good. Secondly, agents do not need others to obtain
their desired assignment, i.e. quotas are exogenous.
They study the egalitarian and the equal income competitive solution. They show that the
egalitarian solution is Lorenz dominant and can always be supported by competitive prices.
Therefore, because the competitive solution is Lorenz dominant, the competitive solution
can be easily computed as the maximization of the Nash product of agents’ utilities. They
also prove that the egalitarian solution is group strategy-proof.
Roth et al. (2005) show that the egalitarian solution is also Lorenz dominant in assignment
problems on arbitrary graphs that are not necessarily bipartite. Assignment on the
dichotomous domain of preferences has been further studied by Bogomolnaia et al. (2005),
Katta and Sethuraman (2006), and Bouveret and Lang (2008).
2. Shubik’s bridge economy (Shubik, 1971). He considers an economy that needs four
players to create one good, eight to create two, and so on. He shows that the core of
that economy may be empty. We generalize Shubik’s model by considering the division of
games in multiple days.
2For example, LSE requires undergraduate classes and graduate seminars to have a maximum of 15
students. King’s College London has a maximum size of 18 students per class.
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3. Multi-unit assignment with exogenous quotas, commonly known as the Course Allocation
Problem (CAP), described by Brams and Kilgour (2001); Budish (2011); Budish and
Cantillon (2012); Kominers et al. (2010); Krishna and U¨nver (2008); and So¨nmez and
U¨nver (2010), with an important difference. In CAP the number of seats available for each
course (in this case game slots per day) is fixed and given exogenously, whereas in GTPs
the number of seats is determined endogenously by players’ preferences, representing the
real possibility that the number of courses is not fully fixed in practice. This difference
is important theoretically, because players may manipulate an allocation mechanism by
changing the total number of seats available.
Additionally, in the combinatorial CAP version (Budish, 2011), players may have arbitrary
preferences over the set of days. However, reporting combinatorial preferences is unfeasible
for even few alternatives, and in practice combinatorial mechanisms never allow players
to report such preferences fully, not only because such revelation would be complicated,
but also because players may not know their preferences in that detail. Consequently,
a new strand of theory has focused on allocation mechanisms with simpler preferences
(Bogomolnaia et al., 2017; Bouveret and Lemaˆıtre, 2016), which are used successfully in
modern fair division procedures in real life: see Spliddit.com (Goldman and Procaccia,
2015).
Although our preference domain is much smaller than those considered in CAP, it is not
contained in any of those because CAP rules out indifferences.
Finally, Budish (2011) only considers deterministic assignments. We study random-
ized assignments instead: in practice many allocation mechanisms use some degree of
randomization to achieve a higher degree of fairness.3
3Randomization is used to assign both permanent visas and housing subsidies in the US, or school
places in the UK. Sources: “A one in a million chance at a better life”, The Guardian, 2/5/2017, “Why
does random chance decide who gets housing subsidies?”, NPR, 3/5/2016, and “School admissions: is a
lottery a fairer system?”, The Guardian, 14/3/2017.
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2.2 Summary of Results
We define the egalitarian and the constrained competitive solution. The egalitarian one is
Lorenz dominant in the set of efficient utility profiles (Theorem 1), while the competitive
one exists (Theorem 2) but is multi-valued (Example 1). The egalitarian solution is group
strategy-proof, but the competitive one is not (Theorem 3). Both solutions are disjoint
(Example 2).
We show that there are no competitive prices supporting the egalitarian solution, which
is a stark difference between our model and BM04. As a consequence, the classical result
stating that the competitive solution can be computed as the maximizer of the Nash
product of utilities no longer holds: a result known as the Eisenberg-Gale program.
This result is key for algorithmic game theory as it establishes an easy method for
computing economic equilibria. Its failure is important not only because leaves us with no
known algorithm for computing equilibria, but also because the Eisenberg-Gale program
is a rather robust result that applies to a large class of utility functions beyond the linear
case (Vazirani, 2007) and to the division of goods and bads (Bogomolnaia et al., 2017).
The fact that the competitive solution is not unique is also interesting, as a unique
utility profile is always obtained in Fisher markets (which is itself another consequence of
solving the Eisenberg-Gale convex program, see Theorem 5.1 in Vazirani, 2007).
We show that the egalitarian solution violates a natural fairness requirement called
independence of perfect days. We construct a refined egalitarian solution that achieves
this property, while at the same time being Lorenz dominant for the set of overdemanded
days. This refined solution, while appealing, violates group strategy-proofness, unlike the
classical egalitarian solution (Example 3).
This article is structured as follows. Sections 3 and 4 formalize the model and the
solutions we consider, respectively. Section 5 analyzes the solutions’ manipulation, while
Section 6 introduces the property of independence of perfect days. Section 7 discusses how
our findings extend to the model in which agents face upper limits on the number of days
they want to play.
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We defer all proofs to the Appendix. In all of our Examples (not in the proofs), we fix
the quota to 4, but it is easily seen that our arguments generalize.
2.3 Model
Let R be a n×m binary matrix containing the availability of each person i ∈ N about
playing on day k ∈M . The entry rik = 1 if person i is available to play on day k, and 0
otherwise. Abusing notation slightly, RiM (resp. RNk) denotes both the i-th row (k-th
column) of R and the set of days k ∈M (resp. players i ∈ N) for which rik = 1.
Let q ≥ 2 be the number of people required for making a game. The notation bxc
denotes the floor function applied to x, i.e. b3.2c = 3. For each day k ∈M , there are δ(k)
identical slots to assign, where δ is given by
δ(k) = q ·
⌊ |RNk|
q
⌋
(2.1)
and δ = (δ(1), . . . , δ(m)) is the vector of available slots. The set of slots for a day k is
denoted by Sk, and S represents the set of all slots, i.e. S =
⋃
M Sk. The pair (R, q) is
called a generalized tennis problem or GTP. The matching size of a GTP is denoted
by ν(R, q) =
∑
k∈M δ(k).
A random assignment is a probability distribution over allocations of slots to players
such that no player receives more than one slot per day. It can be represented by a
random allocation matrix (RAM) Z, which entry zik denotes the probability of person
i playing on day k.
F(R, q) denotes the set of all RAMs for the GTP (R, q). To describe it, we need to
define individually rational (IR) matrices first, i.e. those that assign positive probabilities
only to days in which a player is available. Formally, the matrix X is IR for R if they are
of same size and, ∀i ∈ N, k ∈M , xik > 0 only if rik > 0. Then
F(R, q) = {Z ∈ [0, 1]n×m | Z is IR for R and ∀k ∈M,
∑
i∈N
zik = δ(k)} (2.2)
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As before, the notation ZiM (resp. ZNk) denotes both the i-th row (k-th column) of Z
and the set of days k ∈M (resp. players i ∈ N) for which zik = 1.
Several random assignments can have the same corresponding RAM. Theorem 1 in
Budish et al. (2013) implies4 that
Lemma 1. Any RAM can be decomposed into a convex combination of deterministic
binary RAMs, and thus can be implemented.
We assume that players are indifferent between when and with whom they play, as
long as they do it on an available day. The canonical utility function representing those
preferences is
ui(Z) =
∑
k∈M
zik =
∑
k∈M
rik · zik (2.3)
for an arbitrary agent i ∈ N and an arbitrary Z that is IR for R. This function is
clearly not unique but it is convenient to work with. The preference relation represented
by it is a complete order over all feasible and individually rational random assignments.
The preference relation represented by the utility function above implies that a RAM
Z is Pareto optimal in a GTP (R, q) if and only if Z ∈ F(R, q).
The set of efficient utility profiles U(R, q) can be described as
U(R, q) = {U ∈ Rn | ∃Z ∈ F(R, q) : Ui =
∑
k∈M
rikzik, ∀i ∈ N} (2.4)
We do not distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post efficiency because in our preference
domain they coincide. This equivalence occurs because in all efficient assignments the
sum of utilities is constant and equal to the matching size of the problem ν(R, q).5 In our
setup, efficiency simply requires that no game slot is wasted.
A welfarist solution is a mapping Φ from (R, q) to a set of efficient utility profiles in
U(R, q), and hence it only focuses on the expected number of slots received by an agent
4The implication follows because the set of vertical constraints on any RAM is a hierarchy. Hierarchies
are also known as laminar families in combinatorial optimization.
5A RAM is ex-post efficient if it can be written as a convex combination of deterministic Pareto optimal
RAMs, and ex-ante efficient if it is optimal with respect to agents’ preferences over lotteries. Both notions
are equivalent in assignment problems with dichotomous preferences (BM04, Roth et al., 2005).
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and not on the exact probability distribution over deterministic assignments. Whenever a
solution is single-valued we use the notation φ instead.
For each GTP (R, q) there exists a corresponding course allocation problem (CAP),
defined as a tuple (N,M, δ,R) in which N is the set of students, M is the set of courses,
δ is the vector of exogenous capacities for each course, and R contains the preferences
of each student over the set of courses. Therefore, any statement we make about the
efficiency and fairness for GTP solutions also applies to the corresponding CAP.6
2.3.1 Reductions and Decompositions
Any day in which there are less than q players available is irrelevant and can be deleted.
Players who are always unavailable or that are only available on irrelevant days are
inconsequential too and are also removed. Henceforth we work with the corresponding
irreducible problem of any GTP, which satisfies
∀i ∈ N, RiM 6= ∅ (2.5)
∀k ∈M, |RNk| ≥ q (2.6)
Furthermore, for any GTP (R, q), we can partition the corresponding set of days
M into two subsets P(R, q) and O(R, q), which are called perfect and overdemanded
respectively.7 The set of perfect days is defined as
P(R, q) = {k ∈M : |RNk| = δ(k)} (2.7)
Given a GTP (R, q), a perfect complement for player i represents adding an arbitrary
perfect day in which i can play. Formally, a perfect complement for player i in a GTP (R, q)
is a pair (k′, RNk′) such that k′ /∈ M , rik′ = 1, and k′ ∈ P([RRNk′ ], q), where [RRNk′ ]
6We emphasize again that the equivalence between GTPs and CAPs only holds for CAP without
horizontal constraints, i.e. without limits on how many days each agent can play.
7These categories can be thought of as the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition of the bipartite graph
G = ((N,Sk), RNk) associated with the matching problem in day k.
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denotes the n × (m + 1) juxtaposition of the two matrices. The GTP ([RRNk′ ], q) is a
perfect extension of the original problem for player i.
2.4 Three Efficient Solutions
2.4.1 The Egalitarian Solution
An intuitive solution equalizes players’ utilities as much as possible respecting efficiency
and individual rationality: this is the well-known leximin solution. We refer to it as the
Egalitarian Solution (ES), proposed theoretically by BM04, and applied to the exchange
of live donor kidneys for transplant by Roth et al. (2005) and Yılmaz (2011).
To define it formally, let l be the well-known lexicographic order.8 For each U ∈ Rn,
let γ(U) ∈ Rn be the vector containing the same elements as U but sorted in ascending
order, i.e. γ1(U) ≤ . . . ≤ γn(U). The leximin order LM is defined by U LM U ′ if and
only if γ(U) l γ(U ′). The ES is defined by
φES(R, q) = arg max
LM
U(R, q) (2.8)
The ES satisfies a strong fairness notion called Lorenz dominance, defined as follows.
Define the order ld on Rn so that for any two vectors U and U ′, U ld U ′ only if∑t
i=1 Ui ≥
∑t
i=1 U
′
i ∀t ≤ n, with strict inequality for some t. We say that U Lorenz
dominates U ′, written U LD U ′, if γ(U) ld γ(U ′). A vector U ∈ U(R, q) is Lorenz
dominant for a GTP (R, q) if it Lorenz dominates any other vector in U(R, q).
Lorenz dominance is a partial order in U(R, q) and therefore a Lorenz dominant utility
profile need not exist. Nevertheless, the ES solution is Lorenz dominant.
Theorem 1. The ES solution is Lorenz dominant in the set of efficient utility profiles.
We prove Theorem 1 using Theorem 3 in Dutta and Ray (1989), which states that
the core of every supermodular cooperative game has a Lorenz dominant element. We
postpone to the Appendix the construction of the corresponding cooperative game.
8So that for any two vectors U,U ′ ∈ Rn, U l U ′ only if Ut > U ′t for some integer t ≤ n, and Up = U ′p
for any positive integer p ≤ t.
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The reader may think that Theorem 1 extends to the case when players may have
arbitrary preferences that are not dichotomous. This is not the case. Consider a problem
with n = 7, m = 3, q = 4, and players utilities given by subtable 2.2a. The players give
a 2 to a day in which they really like to play on, a 1 on a day they are available but do
not prefer as much as a day to which they gave a 2, and 0 to a day in which they are not
available at all.
Table 2.2: The limits of Theorem 1
N\M M T W
a 2 1 1
b 1 2 0
c 1 2 0
d 0 2 2
e 1 0 2
f 1 0 2
(a) Corresponding R matrix.
M T W
4/9 1 1
8/9 1 0
8/9 1 0
0 1 1
8/9 0 1
8/9 0 1
(b) RAM supporting ES.
M T W
1 1 1
0 1 0
1 1 0
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 0 1
(c) Alternative RAM.
The egalitarian solution suggests the utility profile (2.89, 2.89, 2.89, 4, 2.89, 2.89),
which produces a total of 18.44 units of utility. However, consider the RAM in subtable
2.2c, suggesting the utility profile (4, 2, 3, 4, 3, 3). The ES utility profile does not Lorenz
dominate this feasible utility profile, showing that Theorem 1 only works with dichotomous
preferences.
2.4.2 The Constrained Competitive Equilibrium with Equal In-
comes
A second solution, substantially more complicated, requires to find an equilibrium between
supply and demand of slots when players are endowed with equal budgets. These equal
budgets are often normalized to one currency unit, a normalization that we also use. This
solution is known as the Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes or CEEI
(Varian, 1974; Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979). In our tennis problem, each agent can
consume at most one slot per day, hence having particular constraints on their consumption
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set that play a major role. We use the term Constrained Competitive Equilibrium
(CCE, still with equal incomes) from now on to make this distinction obvious.9
The CCE solution is different from the CEEI as defined in Hylland and Zeckhauser
(1979) in that they impose no constraints in the goods to be consumed: in our case agents
never partially consume goods that have different prices, see their Table 1 in their paper.
This difference justifies the different terminology of CCE.
Definition 1. A CCE for a GTP (R, q) is a pair of a RAM Z∗ and a non-negative price
vector p∗ such that, ∀i ∈ N , agents maximize their utilities
Z∗iM ∈ arg max
ZiM∈βi(p∗)
ui(ZiM) (2.9)
where βi(p) is the budget set defined as βi(p) = {ZiM |
∑
k∈M zik ≤ |RiM | ; p ·ZiM ≤ 1},
and the market clears, so that
Z∗ ∈ F(R, q) (2.10)
As we shall see in Theorem 2, the set of CCE is never empty but may be large. The
optimality conditions of CCE imply
k /∈ P(R, q) =⇒ p∗k > 0 (2.11)
z∗ik, z
∗
ik′ ∈ (0, 1) =⇒ p∗k = p∗k′ (2.12)
[p∗k < p
∗
k′ ] ∧ [0 < z∗ik′ ] =⇒ z∗ik = 1 (2.13)∑
k
z∗ik < |RiM | =⇒
∑
k
p∗k · z∗ik = 1 (2.14)
These are the equivalent of the Fisher equations in our model, see Brainard and Scarf
(2005). Condition (2.11) allows a zero price only for perfect days, while expression (2.12)
forces the same marginal benefit for every good in which the agents plays with a strictly
positive probability but not with certainty.
9We stress that the CCE is a standard competitive equilibrium with restricted preferences.
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The CCE is in general multivalued. Given a GTP, we denote the set of pairs (Z∗, p∗)
as C(R, q). The CCE solution is defined by
ΦCCE(R, q) = {u(Z ′) | ∃ p′ : (Z ′, p′) ∈ C(R, q)} (2.15)
2.4.3 The Naive Egalitarian per Day
Finally, a naive and most intuitive solution (that we use as a benchmark only) breaks
up the allocation problem into m sub-problems of assigning Sk into RNk, giving an equal
share of the slots in day k among all players available on that day. We call this solution
Egalitarian Per Day (EPD). This is, given a GTP (R, q), the EPD solution assigns to
each player
φEPDi (R, q) =
∑
k∈M
rik · δ(k)|RNk| (2.16)
We note that, in our preference domain, EPD is equivalent to the well-known random
priority mechanism, aka random serial dictatorship.10 We do not consider EPD an
appropriate solution for GTPs because it ignores the interaction between the m fair
division problems of each day.
EPD also fails the following basic fairness property: if n−1 players get at least 1 utility
unit, the n-th player also gets at least 1 utility unit too; see Example 1 for an illustration.
2.4.4 Two Examples Showing that All the Solutions Differ
Example 1 (Multivalued CCE differs from EPD). Table 2.3 shows the different outcomes
these three solutions produce for a problem with n = 6, m = 3, q = 4, and R given
in subtable 2.3a. The CCE utilities are written in brackets in subtable 2.3b because
there are CCE that support utility profiles between (2.4, 1.4, 1) and (2.25, 2, 1) with
0 ≤ pW ≤ 49 . This multiplicity is interesting: the competitive solution is always unique in
the corresponding utility profile in Fisher markets, and also in the more general Eisenberg-
10EPD would not be efficient in a more general domain of preferences. The equivalence with random
priority would also disappear.
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Gale markets; see for example Theorem 5.1 in Vazirani (2007) or p. 87 in Jain and Vazirani
(2010). It is also problematic, as there is no obvious selection from the CCE.
Table 2.3: Example 1
N\M Mon Tue Wed Total
a : d 1 1 1 3
e 1 1 0 2
f 1 0 0 1
Total 6 5 4
(a) Corresponding R matrix.
N\Solution ES CCE EPD
a:d 2.25 [2.25 - 2.4] 2.47
e 2 [1.4 - 2] 1.47
f 1 1 0.67
(b) Utility profiles for each solution.
Any CCE in example 1 gives a slot with probability one to player f . This implies that
there are no CCE prices that support the EPD outcome, and thus is a strong argument
against this solution, as competitive equilibria are considered “essentially the description
of perfect justice” (Arnsperger, 1994), and the base of Dworkin’s “equality of resources”
(Dworkin, 1981).
The EPD solution is therefore not ideal, as expected. But interestingly, the ES solution
can also produce outcomes that cannot be supported as a CCE.
Example 2 (ES differs from CCE). We show it using a GTP with n = 9, m = 6, q = 4,
and R given in subtable 2.4a. Note that in the single-unit case (Theorem 1 in BM04), the
ES is always supported by competitive prices.
Table 2.4: Example 2.
N\M M T W:Th F:S Total
a : c 1 1 0 0 2
d 0 1 1 0 3
e 0 1 0 1 3
f : i 1 0 1 1 5
Total 7 5 5 5
(a) Corresponding R matrix.
M T W:Th F:S Total
1 0.97 0 0 1.97
0 0.54 1 0 2.54
0 0.54 0 1 2.54
0.25 0 0.75 0.75 3.25
4 4 4 4
(b) Corresponding Z∗.
If the ES solution (2, 2.5, 2.5, 3.25) could be supported as a CCE, then pM = pW =
pTh = pF = pS because agents f :i play with positive probability in those days. Furthermore,
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players d:i must spend their whole budget, implying prices pM =
4
13
and pT =
10
13
. However,
at such prices, the ES utility for players a:c is unaffordable.11
The fact that ES and CCE do not coincide is interesting: in the non constrained
context, the competitive solution can be computed by maximizing the Nash product,
solving what is known as the Eisenberg-Gale program (Eisenberg, 1961; Eisenberg and
Gale, 1959; Chipman, 1974, see chapter 7 in Moulin (2003) for a textbook treatment or
Sobel (2009) for a brief overview). That the competitive solution cannot be computed
solving the Eisenberg-Gale program implies that we lack an algorithm for computing the
competitive equilibrium, which can be a hard task (Uzawa, 1962; Othman et al., 2010,
2014).
The Eisenberg-Gale program is otherwise a rather robust result since it extends to a
large family of utility functions beyond the linear case (Jain and Vazirani, 2010), as well
as to the mixed division of goods and bads (Bogomolnaia et al., 2017).
The multiplicity of the competitive solution and its non-equivalence with the egalitarian
outcome justify the new terminology of CCE. For any GTP, the set of CCE is non-empty,
a result we prove in the Appendix using a classical fixed point argument with a small
twist. We summarize our findings in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. For generalized tennis problems, the ES solution is well-defined and single-
valued, and the CCE solution exists. Their intersection can be empty.
2.4.5 Minimal Fairness Guarantees
It is easy to see that both the ES and CCE solutions achieve minimal fairness guarantees
existing in the literature: namely equal treatment of equals and envy-freeness.
A solution φ treats equals equally if, for any GTP (R, q) that has players i and j such
that RiM = RjM , φi(R, q) = φj(R, q). A solution φ is envy-free if, for any GTP (R, q)
with players i and j such that RiM ⊆ RjM , φi(R, q) ≤ φj(R, q). Clearly, envy-freeness
implies equal treatment of equals. For a multi-valued solution, both properties hold if they
hold for any selection of it.
11We do not consider the possibility that prices are defined over bundles, an interpretation which is not
very intuitive in our model, but which is often used in combinatorial auctions.
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Lemma 2. ES and CCE are envy-free, and hence treat equals equally.
We postpone an easy proof. Note that there is no efficient solution that is strongly
envy-free, i.e. that for any GTP (R, q) with players i and j such that |RiM | < |RjM |,
φi(R, q) ≤ φj(R, q), see Theorem 1 in Ortega (2016).
2.5 Manipulation by a Group of Players
We consider players’ manipulation in the direct revelation mechanism associated with
each solution. To do so, we need to know exactly how the tennis slots are assigned. A
detailed solution ψ maps every GTP (R, q) into a RAM Z ∈ F(R, q), specifying which
agents play in which day, whereas a welfarist solution φ maps every GTP into a utility
profile U ∈ U(R, q) and only tells us the expected number of games received by each player.
Every detailed solution ψ projects onto the welfarist solution φ(R, q) = u(ψ(R, q)).
The direct revelation mechanism associated with a detailed solution ψ is such that all
players reveal their preferences RiM , and then ψ is applied to the corresponding irreducible
problem (R, q), implementing the RAM ψ(R, q) = Z.
We assume that player i with true preferences RiM can only misrepresent her preferences
by declaring a profile R′iM ⊂ RiM . The intuition is that, declaring to be available on days
players are not, would be strongly punished by the schedule designer in case of a game
cancellation. Such assumption has already been imposed in scheduling problems in the
context of algorithmic mechanism design (Koutsoupias, 2014). We say then that R′iM is
IR for RiM (Section 3).
Considering manipulations in which players can exaggerate their availability is compli-
cated for a number of reasons. First, to define it properly we would need to specify how
the players substitute between goods and bads, i.e. in our tennis example, how many good
days is a bad day worth. Secondly, if we allow transfers of days, so that a player obtains
a game in a day she is unavailable, she can transfer it to another player, it is very likely
that no rule, even a dictatorship, would be non-manipulable.
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A detailed solution ψ is group strategy-proof12 if for every GTP (R, q) and every
coalition S ⊂ N , @ R′ satisfying i) R′jM = RjM ∀j /∈ S, and ii) R′SM is IR for RSM , such
that
∀i ∈ S, ui(ψ(R′, q)) ≥ ui(ψ(R, q)) (2.17)
with strict inequality for at least one player in S. A welfarist solution φ is group
strategy-proof only if every detailed solution ψ projecting onto φ is group strategy-proof.
BM04 show that any deterministic solution fails group strategy-proofness for single-unit
assignment, including priority solutions, i.e. those in which players choose sequentially
their most preferred available bundle according to a specific order. The reason is that the
player with the highest priority could change his report and still receive one acceptable
alternative, leaving his utility unchanged, and at the same time benefiting a player with
low priority: a property known as bossiness.
The argument does not extend to GTPs. Because agents can play on multiple days,
the player with higher priority can belong to a manipulating coalition only by claiming
fewer days. But since she has the highest priority, it is immediate that such manipulation
would always give her strictly less utility, so she cannot be in the coalition. The same
argument applies to all remaining players and, consequently,
Lemma 3. Any deterministic priority solution is group strategy-proof.
The previous Lemma shows that group strategy-proofness is relatively easy to achieve
for GTPs in the dichotomous domain, in fact we show below that the ES solution also
satisfies it. Is CCE also group strategy-proof? There are two extensions of our group
strategy-proofness definition to set valued solutions.
One requires that for every GTP (R, q), there is no equilibrium of the manipulated
GTP (R′, q) that is weakly better than every equilibria of the original problem (R, q), for
every member of the manipulating coalition S. A stronger extension is that there is at
least one equilibrium of (R, q) that yields a weakly higher utility than some equilibrium of
12We note again that our definition corresponds to the one of partial group strategy-proofness, as we do
not consider manipulations in which players exaggerate their availability.
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(R′, q), with strict inequality for at least one member of the deviating coalition S. It turns
out that CCE violates both conditions.13 The reason is that a group can coordinate to
make several days perfect, and thus price them at 0.
Theorem 3. ES is group strategy-proof but CCE is not.
We postpone the proof of ES being group strategy-proof to the Appendix, but we show,
using a simple example, that CCE is unambiguously manipulable by groups.
Example 3 (CCE not group strategy-proof). Let n = 7, m = 4, q = 4, and R given by
Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Example 3.
N\M M T W Th ΦCCE
a 1 1 1 1 2.5
b 1 1 1 1 2.5
c 1 1 1 1 2.5
d 1 0 1 1 2.5
e 1 1 0 1 2.5
f 1 1 1 0 2.5
g 1 0 0 0 1
Total 7 5 5 5
(a) True preferences R.
M T W Th ΦCCE
1 0 1 1 [2.5 - 2.57]
1 1 0 1 [2.5 - 2.57]
1 1 0 1 [2.5 - 2.57]
1 0 1 0 [2.5 - 2.57]
1 1 0 1 [2.5 - 2.57]
1 1 1 0 [2.5 - 2.57]
1 0 0 0 [0.57 - 1]
7 5 5 5
(b) Misreport R′ for S = {e, f, g}.
Consider the coalition S = {a, b, c}. When players submit their real preferences, there
exists a unique CCE that supports the ES solution: players a, b, c obtain 2.5 expected
tennis games. By changing their report each on a different day, as in subtable 2.5b, they
make Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday perfect days, thus enlarging the set of CCE
solutions, which includes utilities that are always weakly above 2.5 and up to 2.57. By
misrepresenting and creating artificially perfect days, they allow those days to be priced
at 0, weakly increasing the number of expected slots received in any equilibria of (R′, q),
at the expense of players with limited availability, in this case g.
Given that ES is impossible to manipulate, unique, and Lorenz dominant, we suggest
its use as a solution for GTPs. The competitive solution lacks these three properties.
13A weaker notion of group strategy-proofness is satisfied if there is a selection of the CCE solution in
which no coalition of agents can weakly benefit, with one making positive gains. We are unsure whether
the CCE satisfies this condition, we conjecture that it does.
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Two remarks on the manipulation of our solutions. First, we do not discuss strategy-
proofness (manipulation by individuals on their own) as it is immediate that ES (and
EPD) satisfy it. For CCE, we can construct a selection of it that is strategy-proof, as
reducing the total availability for a day either reduces the day’s price, relatively increasing
the price of other days, or it leaves the day’s price unchanged.
Secondly, even though ES is group strategy-proof, it may offer weak incentives for
truthful preference revelation for some players, so that they may misreport without affecting
the solution outcome. This is a concern only inasmuch as the designer cares to perfectly
capture players’ availability. Players who may misreport never affect the number of slots
available, so this lack of truthful revelation has no effect on the solution outcome.
Efficiency, fairness, and non-manipulability are standard goals in the design of resource
allocation mechanisms. Now we consider a new goal that arises naturally for GTPs.
2.6 Independence of Perfect Days
Some solutions do not depend on the number of perfect days on which a player is available.
If an agent is available on an extra perfect day we could expect that she would always
receive one extra expected day in full. This is what our following property captures.
A solution φ is independent of perfect days (IPD) if, for every GTP, every i ∈ N
and for any of its perfect extensions ([R RNk′ ], q),
φi(R, q) + 1 = φi([R RNk′ ], q) (2.18)
IPD is a desirable property because of two reasons. Firstly, perfect days belong
unambiguously to players available on them, so they can argue that they should obtain
them fully, irrespectively of the share they obtain from overdemanded days. Secondly, if
the clearinghouse used a solution that was not IPD, the set of players who are available on
perfect days could avoid reporting their availability for perfect days and organize a game
on perfect days outside the centralized mechanism. That way, they would obtain a better
share from the overdemanded days while fully receiving the benefits of perfect days.
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Only one of our solutions (partially) satisfies this requirement.
Lemma 4. Although ES is not IPD, there exists a selection of CCE that satisfies IPD.
Lemma 4 highlights that CCE can always assign a zero price to all perfect days: this
is the how we construct the selection of CCE that satisfies IPD. But it may also assign a
zero price to some perfect days only, or to no perfect day at all. The designer has a high
flexibility choosing the equilibrium prices.
The selection problem extends to Budish (2011) competitive mechanism for CAP in
which students reveal their preferences to a centralized clearinghouse who announces a
corresponding equilibrium allocation. Budish argues that this mechanism is transparent,
meaning that students can verify that the allocation is an equilibrium. But the mechanism
can be “manipulated from the inside”, assigning selectively zero prices to hand-picked
courses, while at the same time rightly arguing that it produces a competitive allocation.
If IPD must be achieved (a decision depending on the context and the designer’s
objectives), we would like to have a solution that, at the same time, avoids the multiplicity
problem of the CCE, while being envy-free and as egalitarian as possible.
Such solution exists: we call it the refined egalitarian solution or ES*. To define
it, we use the partition of M into P(R, q) and O(R, q), and split the original GTP (R, q)
into two independent problems (RNP(R,q), q) and (RNO(R,q), q), which correspond to the
independent GTPs with perfect and the overdemanded days, respectively. ES* is given by
φES
∗
i (R, q) = φ
ES(RNO(R,q), q) +
∣∣RiP(R,q)∣∣ (2.19)
ES* takes the egalitarian solution for the GTP with overdemanded days only, and adds
the number of perfect days in which a player is available. ES* is close to a suggestion in
Budish (2011). Budish, recognizing that some courses may be in excess supply, informally
proposes to run the allocation mechanism only on the set of overdemanded courses: “if
some courses are known to be in substantial excess supply, we can reformulate the problem
as one of allocating only the potential scarce courses”. ES* does exactly that, making
precise what “substantial” means. It also satisfies several desiderata.
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Lemma 5. The ES* solution is well-defined and single-valued, efficient, IPD, envy-free,
and Lorenz dominant for the problem (RNO(R,q), q).
It is immediate that ES* is single-valued, efficient and IPD. The remaining properties
are straightforward modifications of the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 and Theorem 1.
Unfortunately, the properties in Lemma 4 come at a cost: ES* is not group strategy-
proof.14 ES* can be manipulated by groups reducing their availability so to make certain
days perfect. Therefore, the members of the manipulating coalition obtain those days fully,
while obtaining also an egalitarian fraction of the remaining overdemanded problem.
Group strategy-proofness and IPD are compatible: priority solutions like EPD sat-
isfy them both. However, their poor performance with respect to fairness make them
inappropriate for the problems we have considered, as argued in subsection 4.3.
Before concluding the article, we discuss the complexity of solving GTPs with upper
limits on the number of games an agent can play. We refer to those as horizontal quotas.
2.7 Adding Horizontal Quotas
An intuitive generalization of GTPs is to add upper limits or quotas on the number of
games a player is willing to participate in, e.g. an agent that is available on 5 days
but wants to play on at most 3. We did not present the results using this more general
framework because our results do not extend to this setup.
The formalization of this generalized problem is similar to the one of a GTP defined in
Section 3, with minor notational changes. A GTP with horizontal quotas (GTPQ) is a
triple (R, q, κ), where (R, q) is a GTP with n agents, and κ = (κ1, . . . , κn) is a vector of
positive integers such that, ∀i ∈ N , κi ≤ |RiM |.
The set of all canonical RAMs for a GTPQ (R, q, κ) is defined as
F˜(R, q, κ) = {Z ∈ [0, 1]n×m | Z is IR for R, and ∀i ∈ N,
∑
k∈M
zik ≤ κi
and ∀k ∈M,
∑
i∈N
zik mod q = 0} (2.20)
14For a manipulation example, use the GTP and manipulation R′ illustrated in Table 4.
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Given a GTPQ (R, q, κ), the set of feasible RAMs15 is
F(R, q, κ) = {Y ∈ [0, 1]n×m | Y =
∑
l
αlZl} (2.21)
where 0 < αl ≤ 1,
∑
l αl = 1, and every Zl ∈ F˜(R, q, κ).
As before, the set of utility profiles is only defined over the set F(R, q, κ). In the direct
revelation mechanisms for GTPQs, players reveal (RiM , κi), and then a detailed solution
φ is applied to the corresponding irreducible problem (R, q, κ).
Solving a GTPQ is substantially more difficult than solving a GTP. First of all, the
matching size is not constant across Pareto optimal assignments, as we illustrate in
Example 4. Furthermore, we can use the same GTPQ to show that the ES solution is no
longer Lorenz dominant nor group strategy-proof.
Example 4. (ES not Lorenz dominant nor group strategy-proof for GTPQs) Consider
a GTPQ with n = 13, m = 5, q = 4, and (R, κ) given by subtable 2.6a. Two RAMs for
this GTPQ are given in subtables 2.6b and 2.6c. While both are Pareto optimal, their
matching size is 12 and 20, respectively. This is a first stark difference with the structure
of Pareto optimal RAMs in GTPs.
Table 2.6: Example 4
N\M M T W Th F κ
a 1 0 0 0 0 1
b 1 1 0 0 0 1
c 1 0 1 0 0 1
d 1 0 0 1 0 1
e : g 0 1 0 0 1 2
h : j 0 0 1 0 1 2
k : m 0 0 0 1 1 2
Total 4 4 4 4 9
(a) (R, κ)
M T W Th F
1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 8/9
0 0 0 0 8/9
0 0 0 0 8/9
4 0 0 0 8
(b) Z
M T W Th F
0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 8/9
0 0 1 0 8/9
0 0 0 1 8/9
0 4 4 4 8
(c) Z ′
The egalitarian solution for this problem, UES = (UESa , U
ES
b:d , U
ES
e:m) = (1, 1, 1), is obtained
by randomizing between RAM Z with probability 17
18
, and RAM Z ′, with probability 1
18
.
15Defining F(R, q, κ) more succinctly is not possible because the matching size of Pareto optimal RAMs
is not constant. Note also that F˜(R, q, κ) ( F(R, q, κ), as the latter contains RAMs with columns whose
sum is not mod q = 0, that can be obtained from randomization between RAMs in the former.
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The ES solution does not Lorenz dominate the feasible utility profile corresponding to the
RAM Z ′, which is U ′ = (U ′a, U
′
b:d, U
′
e:m) = (0, 1,
17
9
). Moreover, the ES solution is not even
efficient here because more slots can be created by imposing a zero utility for agent a.
The egalitarian solution can be manipulated by groups in several ways. One manipu-
lating coalition is S = {b, e}, with agent b reporting that he is only available on Tuesday
(and agent e reporting her true availability). It is straightforward that now the ES solution
to the new GTPQ (R′, q, κ) is U ′, which benefits agent e (and 8 other agents g : m) while
leaving the utility of agent b unchanged.
Which solution should we use for GTPQs? The problems of CCE that we have discussed
obviously remain, so CCE is as at least as bad as ES, and EPD is not even defined for
GTPQs. Finding a fair, efficient, and non-manipulable solution for GTPs with horizontal
quotas remains an open question that we leave for further research.
2.8 Conclusion
We introduced a novel assignment problem, which differs from the previous literature
in that the number of the goods to be shared is endogenously determined by players’
preferences. Our problem is inspired by scheduling, but can be applied to several other
matching problems in which the number of resources to be assigned is not fixed.
The egalitarian solution is single-valued, Lorenz dominant, and impossible to manipu-
late. For these reasons, we recommend its use as a solution in the dichotomous domain. If
the market designer is interested in satisfying independence of perfect days, the refined
egalitarian solution becomes an appealing alternative.
Two open questions are 1) whether the CCE is single-valued for GTPs with no perfect
days, and 2) whether there are efficient, fair, and non-manipulable solutions for GTPs
with horizontal quotas. Both are hard questions.
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Appendix: Omitted Proofs
Theorem 1 The ES solution is Lorenz dominant in the set of efficient utility profiles.
Proof. Fix a GTP (R, q). Consider the concave cooperative game (N,µ) where µ : 2N → R
is a function that assigns, to each subset of players, the maximum number of slots they
can obtain together, fixing the total number of slots available at ν(R, q). To formalize this
intuitive function, given a coalition S ⊂ N , let us partition the set of days M into M+(S)
and M−(S), defined as
M+(S) = {k ∈M : |RSk| ≤ δ(k)} (2.22)
The function µ is given by
µ(S) =
∑
k∈M+(S)
∑
i∈S
|rik|+
∑
k∈M−(S)
δ(k) (2.23)
This function is clearly submodular, i.e. for any two subsets T, S ⊂ N
µ(S) + µ(T ) ≥ µ(S ∪ T ) + µ(S ∩ T ) (2.24)
The “core from above” is defined as the following set of profiles
C(R, q) = {x ∈ Rn |
∑
i∈N
x = ν(R, q) and @S ⊂ N :
∑
s
xi > µ(S)} (2.25)
It follows from Theorem 3 in Dutta and Ray (1989) that the set C(R, q) has a Lorenz
dominant element and is the egalitarian solution. But by construction of the “core from
above”, U(R, q) ⊂ C(R, q), the ES solution is also Lorenz dominant in the set of efficient
utility profiles U(R, q).
Theorem 2 For generalized tennis problems, the ES solution is well-defined and single-
valued, and the CCE solution exists. Their intersection can be empty.
Proof. Fix a GTP (R, q). Let p ∈ Rm+ be an arbitrary price vector such that p · δ = n, and
use the notation yi = RiM to denote the optimal consumption bundle for player i ∈ N ,
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and yN = (|RN1| , . . . , |RNm|). Note that
p · yN ≥ p · δ (2.26)
Define the vector ~λ as
~λ(p) = (λ1, . . . , λn) = UNIF{p · yi;n} (2.27)
where UNIF denotes the uniform rationing rule: a mapping that gives to every player
the money needed to buy her preferred schedule as long as it is less than λ, chosen so that
p · ~λ = n. Define the sets of satiated and non-satiated players
N0(p) = {i ∈ N | λi = p · yi} (2.28)
N+(p) = {i ∈ N | λi < p · yi} (2.29)
So that λi = λ∀i ∈ N+. Define the demand correspondence di(p) as
di(p) = arg max
ZiM∈I(RiM )
{p · ZiM ≤ λi} (2.30)
where I(RiM) denotes the set of individually rational assignments for RiM . Note
that di(p) = {yi} for every i ∈ N0(p), while for agents in N+(p), any vector zi ∈ di(p)
satisfies p · zi = λ. By Berge’s maximum theorem, the demand correspondence is upper
hemi-continuous and convex valued. The excess demand correspondence for the whole
society, which inherits the properties of di, is given by
e(p) = dN(p)− δ (2.31)
where dN(p) denotes the aggregate demand correspondence for each day. Using the
Gale-Nikaido-Debreu theorem (Theorem 7 in pp. 716-718 of Debreu (1982)), we know
that there exists both a price vector p∗ ∈ R+ and an excess demand vector x∗ ∈ e(p∗) for
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which the following two conditions are satisfied
x∗ = ~0 (2.32)
p∗ · x∗ = 0 (2.33)
Where Walras’ law in equation (2.33) holds by construction of ~λ and d. Finally, ∀i ∈ N
Z∗iM = di(p
∗) (2.34)
so that the corresponding Z∗ ∈ F(R, q) by equation (2.32), concluding the proof of
existence of CCE. That ES is single-valued follows from Theorem 1. We have shown in
Example 2 that for some GTP there do not exist prices that support the ES as a CCE.
Lemma 2 ES and CCE are envy-free, and hence treat equals equally.
Proof. For an arbitrary GTP, let φES(R, q) = (U1, . . . , Ui, Uj, . . . , Un), and assume player
i is envious of j, which means that RjM ⊆ RiM and that there exists a Pigou-Dalton
transfer  so that the utility profile U ′ = (U1, . . . , Ui + , Uj − , . . . , Un) ∈ U(R, q). But
U ′ Lorenz dominates φES(R, q), so φES(R, q) was not the ES solution, a contradiction.
Any selection of the CCE solution is envy-free because of the standard argument: if
there is any player who is envious, she could afford the schedule of the player she envies.
Theorem 3 ES is group strategy-proof but CCE is not.
That CCE is not group strategy-proof was shown in the main text. To show that ES is
group strategy-proof, we start with a few preliminaries. Let Z denote the set of all feasible
RAMs supporting the egalitarian solution, i.e.
Z = {Z ∈ F(R, q) | ∀i ∈ N :
∑
k∈M
zik = φ
ES
i (R, q)} (2.35)
As we mentioned in the main text, a rule is non-bossy if no player can change anyone’s
else utility without changing his own. This is, a solution φ is non-bossy if, for every
GTP (R, q), ∀i ∈ N , and any manipulation R′ such that 1) ∀j 6= i, RjM = R′jM , and 2)
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R′iM ( RiM , we have
φi(R, q) = φi(R
′, q) only if φ(R, q) = φ(R′, q) (2.36)
We show that ES is non-bossy now.
Proof. We proceed by way of contradiction. Let R′ be as specified in the previous definition.
The manipulation may come from a reduction of availability in three types of days:
1. k ∈ P(R, q), but if player i reduces the number of perfect days, she always reduces
the utility she obtains (we postpone this proof), so her utility is not constant and she
cannot be bossy.
2. k ∈ O(R, q) and {k ∈ M | ∃Z ∈ Z : zik = 0}, and hence there is a way to
implement the ES solution even when player i misreported, so her change in availability is
inconsequential and all utilities remain the same, so player i cannot be bossy.
3. k ∈ O(R, q) and {k ∈ M | ∀Z ∈ Z : zik > 0}, so clearly player i’s utility changes,
so she cannot be bossy.
Now we prove our postponed claim: reducing the number of perfect days in which
player i is available always strictly reduces her utility. The certain loss of the perfect
day(s) must be (at least) exactly compensated by an increase of the shares she gets from
all overdemanded days, which is constant in any Z ∈ Z. Player i was not getting full
shares on those day (as otherwise we obtain a contradiction) so another player(s) j must
be obtaining shares those days, implying φESj (R, q) ≤ φESi (R, q). Moreover,
φESi (R, q)− 1 < φESj (R, q) ≤ φESi (R, q) (2.37)
as otherwise j does not transfer any shares to i when i reduces the number of perfect
days. Let γ be the Pigou-Dalton transfer from j to i required so that the utility of i is
kept constant. We have
φESi (R
′, q) = φESi (R, q)− 1 + γ = φESj (R, q)− γ < φESi (R, j) (2.38)
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showing that indeed reducing the number of perfect days always yields lower utility,
and thus concluding the proof that ES is non-bossy.
We are now ready to prove that ES is group strategy-proof. We will do it by showing
that nobody can join a manipulating coalition.
Proof. By way of contradiction, assume there exists a GTP (R, q), a coalition S ( N ,
and a manipulation R′ such that, for all i ∈ S φESi (R′, q) ≥ φESi (R, q), and for some j ∈ S
φESj (R
′, q) > φESj (R, q).
Let φES(R, q) = UES and order the players such that UES1 ≤ . . . ≤ UESn . We will show
by induction on the order of players the following property
i /∈ S (2.39)
There are two cases in which an agent i can be in S. Case 1) either he gets more utility,
φESi (R
′, q) > φESi (R, q), or case 2) he gets the same utility but he changes his reported
preferences to help another member of S. This is ruled out by non-bossiness of ES so we
focus on case 1) only.
We prove it for i = 1 first, i.e. the player with lowest utility. Player 1 gets a strictly
higher number of slots with the new profile R′, which must come from a set of days K ⊆
O(R, q) in which he was not playing with certainty (K = {k ∈M | ∃Z ∈ Z : 0 < zik < 1}),
for which players 2, . . . , q, . . . , t are also available and UES1 = U
ES
2 = . . . = U
ES
t . Those
players exhaust δ(k) entirely; i.e. ∀k ∈ K, ∀Z ∈ Z,∑t1 zik = δ(k).
Let T = {1, . . . , t}∩S. For any availability matrix R′TM that is individually rational for
RTM , the days {k ∈ K | RNk 6= R′Nk} become less overdemanded for players {1, . . . , t} \T ,
and therefore the players in T get less games as a whole. Therefore there must be at least
one player in T who is worst off, and the coalition S is not viable. Therefore 1 /∈ S.
Now we assume that i /∈ S for player i = h − 1 and we show it holds for player h.
We must have that UESh < |RhM |. We assume φES1 (R, q)ES1 < φESh (R, q) as otherwise our
argument for player 1 works exactly the same.
34
If player h ∈ S, it must be that there exists a manipulation R′ so that φh(R′, q) >
φh(R, q). The increase in her utility must come from more game shares on overdemanded
days in which she was not playing with certainty, i.e. Kh = {k ∈M | ∃Z ∈ Z : 0 < zhk <
1}. Some of these days are exhausted by players 1, . . . , h− 1. There is no way player h
could get more shares in any of those days because {1, . . . , h− 1}∩S = ∅ by our induction
step.
Therefore, the increase must come from days that are not exhausted by {1, . . . , h− 1}.
Those days become less overdemanded for {h, . . . , n} \ S, and therefore players in S get
less game shares as a whole. It follows that there must be a player in S who gets less
utility, so coalition S is not viable. Therefore h /∈ S, and this concludes the proof.
As a technical remark, in some assignment problems strategy-proofness plus non-
bossiness implies group strategy-proofness. This is not the case for GTPs: see for example
the refined egalitarian solution ES*, which is strategy-proof and non-bossy, and yet fails
group strategy-proofness.
Lemma 4 Although ES is not IPD, there exists a selection of CCE that satisfies IPD.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that ES is not IPD. Let n = 5,M = {Mon}, q = 4,
and R> = [1 1 1 1 1]. φESi (R, 4) = 0.8 for any player, but adding a perfect day k
′ for any
player i changes φESi ([RRNk′ ], 4) = 1.75 6= 2.
To show that there is a selection of ΦCCE that is IPD, let (Z∗, p∗) be a CCE of (R, q).
Then fix p∗k′ = 0 and, for every i ∈ N let z∗ik′ = 1 if rik′ = 1, and 0 otherwise. The pair
([Z∗ Z∗Nk′ ], (p
∗
1, . . . , p
∗
n, 0)) is a CCE of the new problem ([RRNk′ ], q), because everybody
interested in the perfect day is able to afford it, and the demand for k′ equals its supply,
because the new day is perfect.
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Chapter 3
Can Everybody Benefit from Social
Integration?
Abstract
There is no matching mechanism that satisfies integration monotonicity and
stability. If we require integration monotonicity, we cannot even achieve Pareto
optimality: the only option is to remain segregated.
A weaker monotonicity condition is compatible with Pareto optimality but not
with path independence, which implies that the dynamics of social integration
matter.
If the outcome of integration is stable, integration is always approved by ma-
jority voting, but a non-vanishing fraction of agents always oppose segregation.
The side who receives the proposals in the deferred acceptance algorithm suffers
significant welfare losses, which nevertheless become negligible when societies
grow large.
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riage.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: DC78 (matching theory), J12 (marriage and marital disso-
lution)
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3.1 Our Problem and its Relevance
Imagine several completely isolated communities that match within themselves, but that
could expand their boundaries to merge and match as a unified community instead. The
question I ask is whether every person would prefer that all communities integrate as
one, provided that the matching outcome is either stable or efficient. Some examples that
motivate my research question are:
1. Interracial marriage. Three infamous cases of societies that banned interracial
marriage are i) the U.S. before the Virginia vs Loving case in 1967 (Arrow, 1998; Fryer,
2007), ii) Nazi Germany, where the marriage between arians and non-arians was
forbidden (Caestecker and Fraser, 2008), and iii) South Africa during the apartheid
era, when the the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act was established (Hyslop, 1995).
In all cases, social integration occurred only after complicated social movements,
and without unanimous approval.
2. Centralized Kidney Exchange. After 2000, kidney exchanges began to take place
internally in hospitals around the U.S. Few years after, centralized programs started
to conduct regional kidney exchanges by asking hospitals to share their donor-patient
pairs. Using a centralized procedure would always weakly increase the number of
transplants, yet it has been noticed that some hospitals may not have incentives
to integrate into to the central clearinghouse, preferring to conduct exchanges only
internally. The aforementioned rejection to integrate to a centralized clearinghouse
has been documented in practice (Ashlagi and Roth, 2014).
3. School Desegregation In 1954, school segregation was declared illegal in the U.S.
following the Brown vs Board of Education case. Although the desegregation ruling
was widely acknowledged as a major accomplishment, it was not well-received by
some. A shameful example is the resistance by the governor of Arkansas, who tried
to prevent a few Black students from attending a newly desegregated school. The
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students were able to enter the school only when they were escorted by federal forces
(U.S. Commission of Civil Rights, 1977).
All these examples show instances on which social integration was complicated to
achieve in matching environments. I formalize these environments with an extended
version of the Gale and Shapley (1962) matching problem with non-transferable utility.
The idea of the model is simple: we take several classical Gale-Shapley problems and
find their segregated women-optimal stable partner. Then we put them together and
compute the integrated women-optimal stable matching, and compare who prefers the
integrated matching to the segregated one. Stability is natural requirement to ask for,
because decentralized matching environments produce outcomes close to those predicted
by stability c, and because centralized mechanisms that produce stable outcomes are
widely regarded as successful (Roth, 2002).
I derive several impossibilities showing that social integration cannot benefit everyone
whenever the matching outcome is stable or efficient.1 The impossibility disappears when
only weak integration monotonicity and Pareto efficiency are required: an observation which
may be obvious, but the reader is reminded that weak monotonicity is still incompatible
with stability. Weak integration monotonicity only requires that when the complete society
merges, everybody is better off than remaining in disjoint segregated communities. It says
nothing about the process of partial integration of all communities. I also prove that social
integration is always approved by a weak majority of the population.
Interestingly, such majority rarely surpasses 80% of the population when considering
random instances of matching problems, emphasizing the complicated dynamics of deseg-
regation, and making evident that a non-vanishing minority may oppose social integration
because they foresee that they will be worse off belonging to an integrated community.
Also interestingly, the welfare losses for those who oppose integration become negligible
with respect to the size of the grand society as communities grow large, but in small
societies the side who receives the proposals in the deferred acceptance algorithm suffers
1The impossibilities occur when we require that for every union of disjoint communities, the resulting
matching is weakly better off for each agent.
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significant welfare losses. Finally, it is also surprising that those who oppose integration
are indistinguishable in terms of expected ranking from those who prefer integration.
I use a one-to-one matching framework, but all the impossibility results obviously
extend to the many-to-one matching case. Since the interracial marriage example is the
one closer to one-to-one matching, I will present the model in those terms, but the reader
should keep in mind that the results apply to general matching problems.
After reviewing the related literature in Section 2, Section 3 introduces the model and
defines the integration monotonicity property. Section 4 presents several impossibility
theorems regarding the existence of integration monotonic matchings that have also any
degree of efficiency, emphasizing the rigid structure that monotonicity imposes in matching
problems.
Section 5 details the limits of our impossibility results, showing that although some
agents oppose social integration, they are always a minority. It also describes the size of
such group when the societies become large. Section 6 explores the properties of those
who oppose integration and their welfare loss. Finally, section 7 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
3.2.1 Comparative Statics in Matching Problems
Within the matching literature, there is a body of work that studies how the set of stable
outcomes changes when a new agent joins an existing society. The main result in this
literature is that, when a new man joins a stable matching problem, every women weakly
improves, while every man becomes weakly worse off. This result is robust to various
formulations of the problem such as many-to-one extensions and preferences determined
by choice functions: see theorem 5 in Kelso and Crawford (1982), theorems 2.25 and 2.26
in Roth and Sotomayor (1992), theorems 1 and 2 in Crawford (1991), and theorem 2 in
Chambers and Yenmez (2017).
The aforementioned welfare loss that men suffer when a new men joins the problem
has been recently quantified, by assigning agents with independent random preferences
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over all their partners. Pittel (1989) shows that, in expectation, the side of the society
that proposes in the deferred acceptance algorithm, say men, gets matched to a woman
ranked log(n) in their preference lists, whereas women get in expectation a man in the
n
log(n)
position of theirs. The partner ranked first is the best possible partner, and so on,
and n is the number of potential partners for each agent.
Using the same probabilistic framework as Pittel, Ashlagi et al. (2017) find that just by
adding an additional man, men receive a partner ranked n
log(n)
with high probability (in the
men-optimal matching), whereas women will receive someone close to log(n). Interestingly,
all stable marriages are similar whenever societies are even slightly unbalanced in their
ratio between men and women.
In all cases, the discussion centers on what happens when adding an individual alone
to a society and not when merging isolated societies of same size. This is my main
contribution with respect to the surveyed literature.
3.2.2 Integration and Population Monotonicity Elsewhere
Chambers and Hayashi (2017) introduced integration monotonicity and derived similar
results for economic integration. They consider several exchange economies, in which
each agent has an initial endowment, that integrate as one. They find that there is no
path-independent exchange mechanism that is integration monotonic and Pareto efficient.
If the integration mechanism is Pareto efficient and satisfies the additional property of
equal treatment of equals, it must necessarily harm one third of all agents in the economy.
Sprumont (1990) considers population monotonic schemes in cooperative games with
transferable utility. An allocation scheme is population monotonic if each time an agents
joins an existing problem, the payoff for every existing member increases. He shows that
every convex game admits a population monotonic allocation scheme, and provides a
tighter characterization using linear combinations of games with veto control. His work
deals with transferable utility games only.
Related population monotonicity concepts in cooperative games are widely used in
different environments, based on the seminal work of Moulin and Thomson (Thomson
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(1983), Moulin (1990, 1992); Moulin and Thomson (1988)). This paper’s title is inspired
on the last of those articles. As in the matching literature, all these monotonicity concepts
deal with adding an agent to a problem instead of merging problems of the same size.
Sprumont (2008) presents a detailed review of the work in this area.
3.3 Model
Let Sk be a society of race k that consist of n men Mk and n women W k. I refer to
man i (woman j) that belongs to society k by mki (w
k
j ). When I refer to an agent of
arbitrary gender I use xki ; I omit the subindices when n = 1. There are r ≥ 2 races
and R = {1, . . . , r}. For any subset T ⊆ R, let MT = ⋃k∈T Mk, W T = ⋃k∈T W k, and
ST = MT ∪W T . SR is called the grand society.
Each man (woman) has strict preferences over the entire set of women WR (men
MR) and not only over those belonging to her own race. I represent the preferences of
an arbitrary person xki by P (x
k
i ). F (x
k
i ) denotes the weak preference relation associated
to P (xki ) so that for any two agents y
l
j and z
e
g, y
l
j F (x
k
i ) z
e
g if and only if y
l
j P (x
k
i ) z
e
g or
ylj = z
e
g. I assume that every person prefers matching with any potential partner of the
opposite gender than remaining alone.
P T will denote the preference lists of every person in ST ⊆ SR. The pair (SR, PR) is
an interracial matching problem (IMP).
A matching µ : MR ∪WR × 2R →MR ∪WR is a mapping such that, ∀T ⊆ R,
∀mki ∈MT , µ(mki , T ) ∈ W T (3.1)
∀wki ∈ W T , µ(wki , T ) ∈MT (3.2)
∀xki ∈ ST , µ(µ(xki , T ), T ) = xki (3.3)
so that every man is married to a woman in the specified society ST and vice versa. The
function µ indicates who marries whom under every union of races. Naturally, µ(xki , T ) is
only defined whenever xki ∈ T .
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In the majority of matching literature, a matching is defined instead as a mapping
µ′ : M ∪W →M ∪W . My definition of µ corresponds to the one of an allocation scheme
of the matching µ′, as defined by Sprumont (1990), which specifies a matching µ′ for each
subset of R. For convenience, I just refer to such allocation scheme as a matching.
Let T and Q be an arbitrary partition of R, with T = {a, b, . . . , r′}. Let the colorblind
equivalent of ST be denoted by ST , in which every agent xki ∈ ST becomes of a new
race ab . . . r′, and in which the preferences of each agent in SR remain the same up to the
renaming in agents’ race.
We define the following properties of interest for an arbitrary matching µ, given an
IMP.
Pareto Optimality There is no different matching µ′ such that, for all T ⊆ R and all
xki ∈ ST
µ′(xki , T ) F (x
k
i ) µ(x
k
i , T ), (3.4)
and for some Q ⊆ R and some ylj ∈ SR ,
µ′(ylj, Q) P (y
l
j) µ(y
l
j, Q) (3.5)
Pareto optimality is a classical requirement and a basic efficiency concern. It can be
strengthened to the stronger efficiency concept of stability.
Stability For every subset T ⊆ R, and for every mki , wlj ∈ ST , such that
mki /∈ µ(wlj, T ) and wlj /∈ µ(mki , T ) (3.6)
either
µ(mki , T ) P (m
k
i ) w
l
j or µ(w
l
j, T ) P (w
l
j) m
k
i (3.7)
Stability is an important requirement because it closely predicts realized outcomes
in decentralized environments and because if the final outcome was not stable, it would
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be unlikely that it lasted long from a game-theoretical perspective.2 Now we turn to
integration monotonicity.
Integration Monotonicity For all disjoint subsets T,Q ⊆ R, and for every xki ∈ ST
µ(xki , T ∪Q) F (xki ) µ(xki , T ) (3.8)
Note that integration monotonicity not only requires that the matching obtained when
all races have integrated is better than the one obtained with a society alone. It requires
that anytime another race joins, it always benefits every agent in the existing societies.
We will relax this requirement in Section 5. Finally, we define path independence.
Path Independence For all disjoint subsets T,Q ⊆ R, and for every xki ∈ SR
µ(xki , T ∪Q) = µ(xki , T ∪Q) (3.9)
where T denotes the colorblind equivalent of T .
Path independence is a more technical requirement, but nevertheless relevant because
if a matching violates path independence, the dynamics of integration would play a role in
determining the final pairings.
From our four properties, only stability and Pareto optimality are related.3
Lemma 6. Every stable matching is Pareto optimal.
Proof. Let µ be stable. Therefore in any alternative matching µ′ that is better for person
xki at T ⊆ R, we have that µ(µ′(xki , T ), T ) P (µ′(xki , T )) xki , which means the new partner
of xki prefers matching µ to µ
′ at T , and hence µ′ is not a Pareto improvement.
The converse statement is clearly not true.
2For example, realized romantic pairings are similar to those predicted by stability, see Hitsch et al.
(2010) and Banerjee et al. (2013). Stability is also related to the successful operation of centralized
matching mechanisms such as kidney exchanges programs and school choice (Roth, 2002).
3In exchange economies integration monotonicity and efficiency imply core stability (Lemma 2 in
Chambers and Hayashi (2017)). A similar conclusion applies in the housing model of Shapley and Scarf
(1974). For two-sided matching that relationship does not hold.
44
3.4 Results
Unfortunately, stability and integration monotonicity are not compatible even with just
two societies with two persons each.4
Proposition 1. Not every IMP admits a matching that satisfies stability and integration
monotonicity.
Proof. (Example 1) Let R = {a, b} and n = 1, and let agents’ preferences be
ma : wa P (ma) wb wa : mb P (wa) ma
mb : wa P (mb) wb wb : mb P (wb) ma
The unique stable matching has µ(mk, {k}) = wk for k ∈ {a, b} but µ(wa, R) = mb and
µ(wb, R) = ma. Yet µ violates integration monotonicity forma because µ(ma, {a}) P (ma) µ(ma, R).
The same occurs for wb.
Given that stability and integration monotonicity are incompatible, an obvious question
is whether we can weaken any of those two properties to avoid the impossibility. To address
it, let us define a particular matching, called the segregated matching.
Let λ be a matching such that λ(xki , T ) assigns to each agent x
k
i the women-optimal
stable matching5 in the matching problem (MT ,W T ;P T ) for each T ⊆ R. The segregated
matching σ is defined as
∀T ⊆ R, ∀xki ∈ SR, σ(xki , T ) = σ(xki ) = λ(xki , {k}) (3.10)
so that for any subset T , it assigns to each individual the women-optimal matching obtained
when matching each race alone. The segregated matching is clearly integration monotonic,
4Sprumont (1990) proves a similar result: any assignment game with two men and two women lacks a
population monotonic assignment scheme. His result does not imply any of mines because his works deals
with transferable utility games only.
5I always pick the women-optimal stable matching to have a consistent selection from the set of stable
matchings. We could consider the men-optimal one as well. The selection problem is not a big issue, as in
large societies there is a unique stable matching whenever agents have short preferences or the societies are
unbalanced in their ratio between men and women (Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak,
2009; Ashlagi et al., 2017).
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but it fails to be stable when aggregating the individual societies. The segregated matching
even fails Pareto optimality, as the preferences in Example 2 shows.
Example 2: The segregated matching is not Pareto optimal.
ma : wb P (ma) wa wa : mb P (wa) ma
mb : wa P (mb) wb wb : ma P (wb) mb
I start by weakening stability and requiring Pareto optimality only. Can we obtain
always a matching that is Pareto optimal and integration monotonic? The answer is that
not even such weakening of optimality is enough.
Proposition 2. Not every IMP admits a Pareto optimal and integration monotonic
matching.
Proof. (Example 3) Let R = {a, b, c} and n = 3, and let agents’ preferences be
ma : wb P (ma) wc P (ma) wa wa : mb P (wa) mc P (wa) ma
mb : wc P (mb) wa P (mb) wb wb : mc P (wb) ma P (wb) mb
mc : wa P (mc) wb P (mc) wc wc : ma P (wc) mb P (wc) mc
Any Pareto optimal matching µ has µ(wa, {a, b}) = mb and µ(wa, {a, c}) = mc.
Therefore µ(wa, R) = mb by integration monotonicity. But exactly the same argument for
mb shows that he gets µ(mb, R) = wc. Therefore, no Pareto optimal matching satisfies
integration monotonicity.
Note that Chambers and Hayashi (2017) are always able to find a mechanism that is
Pareto optimal and integration monotonic, although not path-independent. Therefore, the
impossibility we obtain is stronger. A first conclusion is that achieving complete social
integration is more difficult than obtaining complete economic integration.
An immediate corollary follows, showing that if one is to pursue integration monotonic-
ity, there is no room for efficiency even in its weakest form.
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Corollary 1. The only matching that satisfies integration monotonicity in every IMP is
the segregated matching.
Given the negative result obtained, let us focus on matchings that satisfy a more
flexible monotonicity condition, defined below.
Weak Integration Monotonicity For any race k ∈ R, and for every xki ,
µ(xki , R) F (x
k
i ) σ(x
k
i ) (3.11)
Weak integration monotonicity only requires that the corresponding matching when
all races have integrated is better than the segregated matching when all societies are
segregated. It says nothing about the relationship between matchings obtained under
partial integration.
This mild monotonicity is still inconsistent with stability, as our previous Example 1
shows. It can be combined with optimality, yet not without consistency problems.
Proposition 3. Every IMP admits a matching that is weakly integration monotonic and
Pareto efficient. If we add path-independence, we obtain an impossibility.
Proof. For any T ⊆ R, implement the matching σ. If the segregated matching is not
Pareto optimal, then implement a Pareto optimal matching µ that dominates σ, and so
on. Trivially, every agent is better off. Note that every agent has a veto power over stable
matchings that benefits others but hurt her/him.
To show that path-independence cannot be added, consider the society in Example
3. Let us merge societies into their colorblind equivalents: a and b into ab, and a and
c into ac. The unique Pareto optimal matching µ is such that µ(ma1, {ab, c}) = wb1, but
µ(ma1, {ac, b}) = wc1.
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3.5 The Limits of Segregation
How many people prefer segregation over complete integration, provided that the (women-
optimal) stable matching will realize when societies merge? If there will be a referendum
asking whether all individual societies should merge, could it be that segregation would
obtain a majority of votes?
Let us assume that everybody who does not get hurt by integration votes in favor of it.
In Example 1, half of the society votes against integration. Can it be more? The answer
is no.
Proposition 4. For any IMP (SR, PR), at most brnc agents prefer segregation. The
bound is tight.
Proof. Let us partition SR into three sets A, B+ and B−, defined as
A = {xki ∈ SR | λ(xki , R) = σ(xki )} (3.12)
B+ = {xki ∈ SR | λ(xki , R) P (xki ) σ(xki )} (3.13)
So A is the set of people who keep the same partner after integration, B+ are those who
prefer their “integrated” partner, and B− are those who prefer the “segregated” partner.
Now consider the directed graph which contains all women from B+ and B−, in
which every woman points to the woman from whom she “stole” her new husband in the
integrated society, i.e. this is each woman wki points towards σ(λ(w
k
i , R)). A cycle always
forms whenever A 6= SR.
Now consider an arbitrary woman in B+, which must exist if A 6= SR because λ
produces the women-optimal stable matching. She points to a woman wlj, who can either
be in B+ or in B−. If she is in the latter, it must be that σ(wlj) is in B
+, because she
proposed to him at some point in the woman-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm
but he rejected her. This goes on for any woman who is worst off after integration: her
previous partner must necessarily be better off after integration, because he rejected her
when she proposed to him in the deferred acceptance algorithm.
48
It follows that |B+| ≥ |B−|, and thus |A|+ |B+| ≥ |B−|, which implies that always at
least half of the society supports integration, completing the proof.
ma, wa
mb, wb
mc, wc
Figure 3.1: The procedure in the proof of Proposition 4 applied to Example 3.
Proposition 4 only applies to one-to-one matching. To extend it to many-to-one
matching one needs to be careful to define: 1) the structure of the preferences, which may
exhibit substitutes and complements; and 2) how do we count colleges. It could be that
either each college counts as one, or that each college counts for as many seats it has, i.e.
its quota. It is well-known that if preferences are responsive, each many-to-one matching
has a corresponding one-to-one matching, in which each college with capacity or quota qc
is replaced with qc copies of itself. Using this equivalence, our Proposition 4 extends to
many-to-one matchings too.
Proposition 4 is interesting because it tells us that a referendum for integration will
always be accepted by a weak majority. However, it could be that the voting rule we need
is a supermajority, that implements integration only if the number of agents that get hurt
from integration are at most a fraction  of the population.6
A natural conjecture is that, for large societies, integration is always approved in any
-supermajority, for any arbitrarily small . The conjecture is natural because, when
the number of agents grows, agents win a larger pool of potential partners when social
integration realizes. Stated differently, that the fraction of people that reject social
integration is vanishingly small when the societies become large. Yet, this conjecture
6Chambers and Hayashi (2017) use the equivalent concept of integration monotonicity under P-vetoes,
in which at most a group of people of size |P | may oppose integration. Both concepts are mild versions of
integration monotonicity.
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appears to be false for small values of r. Looking at what happens when r is small is
particularly interesting because in reality we have only a few races.
Let (SR, PR) be an IMP in which each agents’ preferences are chosen independently
and uniformly at random from the set of possible strict preferences. Let Ωr(n) denote the
expected number of agents who prefer the segregated matching over the women-optimal
stable matching in the grand society.
Conjecture 1. For r ≤ 5,
lim
n→∞
Ωr(n)
2rn
6= 0 (3.14)
Our conjecture that Ωr(n)
2rn
does not vanish is supported by Monte Carlo simulations
using Matlab presented in Table 1.7 The code used is available from my webpage. I
stopped the simulations at 2n = 1000 because it already took three days to run in a high
performance computing facility (2n is the number of agents of each race). It is clear from
Table 1 that convergence occurs in all cases.
Table 3.1: How many people (in percentage) prefer segregation?
r\2n 100 200 1000
2 25.42 25.76 25.47
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01)
3 25.43 25.83 25.99
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
4 24.84 25.14 25.57
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
5 24.30 24.60 25.05
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Average over a thousand simulations with preferences drawn uniformly at random. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Our Ωr(n)
2rn
≈ .25 is related to theorem 2 in Chambers and Hayashi (2017). Their result
states that when societies merge, the fraction of people who oppose economic integration
is always above one third under equal treatment of equals. Their result, looking at a worst
case scenario, is obtained in a very different fashion. The comparison of our results suggest
7The code was run on the high performance computing facilities of the University of Glasgow, and it
uses the Matlab package to compute the women-optimal stable marriage, developed by S. Gopalakrishnan.
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a second conclusion: it is easier to achieve partial social integration than partial economic
integration.
Using the same probabilistic IMP with random preferences, we can find the expected
welfare gains derived from integration. Applying the well-known result from Pittel (1989)
about expected rankings of partners in random matching problems, it is easy to see that
women get a higher ranked partner in expectation after integration occurs, because
log(n)
(
rn+ 1
n+ 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. ranking w. segregation
− log(rn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. ranking w. integration
=
n(r − 1)
n+ 1
log(n)− log(r) (3.15)
which is positive for all sensible values of r and n, meaning women get a partner
that appears earlier on their preference lists. Similarly, men get a better partner after
integration for sensible values of r and n, because
n
log(n)
(
rn+ 1
n+ 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. ranking w. segregation
− rn
log(rn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
exp. ranking w. integration
= A[(rn+ 1) log(r)− (r − 1) log(n)] (3.16)
where A = n/[(n + 1) log(n) log(rn)]. The gains from integration in an IMP with
random uncorrelated preferences are given by the sum of the previous expressions multiplied
by rn. The normalized gains from integration for a man and a woman are depicted in
Figure 2.
(a) r = 2 (b) r = 5
Figure 3.2: Individual gains from integration divided by rn, by gender
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3.6 Who Prefers Segregation?
First let us look at the expected relative number of people who keep the same partner
after integration. Since the preferences are drawn uniformly, everybody has the same
probability of matching an agent from their own race: this is 1/r. A natural guess is that,
among those, 1/2 of them do not change their marriage, which provides a good intuition
of the real numbers described in Table 2.
Table 3.2: How many people (in percentage) keep the same partner after integration?
r\2n 100 200 1000 1/2r
2 27.26 27.14 27.02 25
(0.12) (0.07) (0.02)
3 18.39 18.23 17.89 16.66
(0.06) (0.03) (0.01)
4 13.93 13.62 13.41 12.5
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
5 11.31 11.21 10.84 10
(0.02) (0.1) (0.01)
Average over a thousand simulations with preferences drawn uniformly at random. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 2 shows that, as r grows, the number of people who are indifferent between
integration and segregation becomes smaller. Since the proportion of people who oppose
social integration keeps relatively constant as described in Table 1, the number of people
who strongly prefer integration does grow, although as we saw it rarely goes over four-fifths
of the entire society.
Another natural conjecture is that the people who oppose social integration have a
lower expected desirability than those who do not. In other words, they are usually ranked
lower in the preference lists of the potential partners. And this new conjecture is false
too. Table 3 describes the expected rank of people who prefer segregation: it is immediate
that those who prefer segregation have the same expected ranking as a random person,
showing that people who prefer segregation are not particularly undesirable agents, they
are just like anybody else.8
8This result depends crucially on the assumption of independent preferences, as it can be noted in the
next Chapter.
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Table 3.3: Average rank of people who prefer segregation, by gender.
r\2n 100 200 1000
women men women men women men
2 50.7 50.5 100.6 100.5 500.5 500.5
(0.30) (0.07) (0.22) (0.10) (0.21) (0.09)
3 75.7 75.5 150.7 150.5 750.6 750.5
(0.25) (0.09) (0.24) (0.08) (0.25) (0.08)
4 100.6 100.5 200.6 200.5 1000.7 1000.5
(0.25) (0.09) (0.27) (0.07) (0.24) (0.08)
5 125.6 125.5 250.6 250.5 1250.6 1250.5
(0.29) (0.08) (0.29) (0.08) (0.28) (0.08)
Average over a thousand simulations with preferences drawn uniformly at random. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Finally, we look at the welfare losses suffered by those who prefer segregation when
integration realizes, in terms of ranking of their current partner. If their loss was relatively
small it would be a strong argument for saying that the impossibilities described in Section
3 are basically irrelevant. Table 4 summarizes an interesting result: the side of the society
who does not propose, in this case men, get severely hurt by integration for moderate
values of n. Women, the proposing side, suffer a moderate hurt at most.
Table 3.4: Average welfare loss by people who prefer segregation, by gender.
r\2n 100 200 1000
women men women men women men
2 4.9 19.7 5.7 34.9 7.4 136.6
(0.91) (9.47) (0.95) (22.91) (1.04) (246.83)
3 5.4 27.4 6.2 49.2 7.9 193.8
(1.01) (14.57) (0.96) (39.22) (0.83) (409.86)
4 5.7 35 6.5 62.1 8.1 250.8
(1.08) (21.67) (1.03) (60.48) (0.84) (623.95)
5 6 41.8 6.8 74.9 8.4 303.3
(1.07) (28.26) (1.14) (84.86) (0.88) (709.15)
Average over a thousand simulations. Welfare loss measured in difference in ranking of partners. Standard errors in
parenthesis.
Table 4 reveals that the welfare loss becomes smaller with respect to the size of the
grand society as n grows, suggesting that they become negligible in the limit. This finding
suggests that integration could be more easily implemented in large societies.
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3.7 Integration with Correlated Preferences
The numbers in Table 4 should be understood as a lower bound for the welfare losses,
which would increase when agents are endowed with correlated preferences. Correlation in
preferences is evident for certain matching environments, like school choice and marriage.
We also assume that preferences are independent from race, an ideal scenario but probably
not the case in reality for many matching environments, see Fisman et al. (2008) and
Garcia (2008) for evidence of racial preferences for dating and school choice, respectively.
In this section, we modify the assumption that preferences are independent, and see
how our results change. The theoretical results of course apply, but what about our
simulation results?
How we introduce correlation in preferences is by defining a random status quo in
preferences for both men and women. This is, an order over all possible partners. Then,
each agent’s preferences is identical to the status quo, except for c positions. The expected
correlation coefficient between each person preferences and the status quo equals ρ = 1− c
nr
.
Note that in all of our previous results the expected correlation coefficient is ρ = 0.
For example, if nr = 6, c = 2, and the status quo is 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, a person preferences
could be 1, 2, 6, 4, 5, 3. In two places of her preference list there were changes. The
changes are chosen randomly, so it could be as well that a person’s preferences are the
status quo itself.
The results we find is that the fraction of people against integration remains similar
around 25% independently of the correlation in preferences, and so does the fraction of
agents who keep the same partner. The expected ranking of those against integration
increases, as expected, implying that those who oppose integration seem to be less likable
by their peers. Also, not surprisingly, the welfare losses of men and women become similar,
because it is well-known that with highly correlated preferences the set of stable matchings
becomes a singleton. We summarize our observations in Table 3.5
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Table 3.5: Statistics for correlated preferences, n = 100, r = 2.
ρ % % Exp. rank Welfare loss
worse same women men women men
0.9 24.61 21.49 105.55 93.92 30.53 31.90
(0.02) (0.06) (59.22) (50.78) (17.75) (24.36)
0.7 26.06 23.13 114.29 89.15 17.22 34.72
(0.02) (0.06) (25.51) (20.07) (8.45) (25.87)
0.5 26.12 25.55 109.67 93.37 10.86 34.81
(0.02) (0.06) (15.81) (11.85) (3.46) (22.99)
0.3 25.89 26.92 104.39 97.46 7.79 34.12
(0.02) (0.07) (6.46) (4.43) (1.83) (21.68)
0.1 25.81 27.18 101.11 100.13 6.14 34.11
(0.02) (0.07) (1.05) (0.62) (1.24) (22.35)
Average over a thousand simulations, 2n = 200. Columns (2) and (3) refer to the expected number of people who get a
worse partner and those who keep the same partner after integration occurs, respectively. All the other columns refer to
statistics of those who get a worse partner under integration. Welfare loss measured in difference in ranking of partners.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
3.8 Conclusion
When two or more communities integrate to match, there are always some people that
become worse off. If the final matching pattern is stable, integration is always approved
by a majority of agents, but the fraction of those that oppose social integration does not
vanish, even when communities grow large. The welfare losses of those hurt by integration
become negligible with respect to the size of the grand society when communities grow
large, suggesting that social integration is easier to achieve in sizable communities.
Two interesting questions remain open. The first one is studying the limits of social
segregation in many to one matching. The impossibility results carry over, but the question
on whether more or less people get hurt by integration, and the exact magnitude of the
welfare losses, remains open.
Secondly, there is a recent literature that studies matching in the large using cardinal
utilities: e.g. Che and Tercieux (2015) and Lee (2017). Their formulation of preferences
makes it easier to introduce correlation, and can provide cardinal measures on the welfare
loss of agents that get hurt by integration. Although I conjecture one would obtain similar
results using their type of formulation, this remains to be shown formally.
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3.9 Appendix: Matlab Code
1 % Matlab Code by JOSUE ORTEGA, Un ive r s i ty o f Glasgow , used in
the a r t i c l e ”Can everyone b e n e f i t from s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n ?”
2 %The s t a b l e marr iage package i s needed , a v a i l a b l e at
3 %https : // uk . mathworks . com/ mat labcentra l / f i l e e x c h a n g e g a l e−shapley
−s tab l e−marriage−a lgor i thm
4 %The func t i on march10 computes i n t e g r a t e d and seg regated
matchings , and we l f a r e ga ins and l o s s e s
5 %The func t i on in t eg ra t i on10 , below , runs the MonteCarlo
s imu la t i on s to obta in the average over many random i n s t a n c e s
6 f unc t i on [ x , y ,SMP,SWP,LOSSM,LOSSW] = march10 (n , r ) ;
7 %n−> Number o f males ( f ema le s ) in each race , balanced s o c i e t i e s
8 %r−> Number o f r a c e s
9 %x−> Number o f people who d i s l i k e i n t e g r a t i o n
10 %y−> 1+Number o f people i n d i f f e r e n t to i n t e g r a t i o n
11 %SM(SW)−> Index o f males ( f emale s ) who p r e f e r s e g r e g a t i o n
12 %SMP(SWP)−> Average rak ing o f s eg r egated males ( f emale s )
13 %LOSSM(LOSSW)−> Average l o s s o f SM (SW) by i n t e g r a t i n g
14 A = ze ro s (n∗ r ) ; %Men p r e f e r e n c e s
15 B = ze ro s (n∗ r ) ; %Women p r e f e r e n c e s
16 f o r i =1:n∗ r
17 A( i , : ) = randperm (n∗ r ) ;%Generates random p r e f e r e n c e s
18 B( i , : ) = randperm (n∗ r ) ;
19 end
20 f o r i =1: r
21 aa{ i } = transpose (A) ;
22 bb{ i } = transpose (B) ;
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23 ind icesA { i } = f i n d ( aa{ i}> i ∗n | aa{ i }<( i −1)∗n+1) ; %
R e s t r i c t i n g p r e f e r e n c e s to t h e i r own race
24 i nd i ce sB { i } = f i n d (bb{ i}> i ∗n | bb{ i }<( i −1)∗n+1) ; %aa{1}
conta in s p r e f e r e n c e s o f men o f race 1 over women o f race 1
25 aa{ i }( ind icesA { i }) = [ ] ;
26 bb{ i }( ind i ce sB { i }) = [ ] ;
27 aa{ i } = transpose ( reshape ( aa{ i } , [ n , n∗ r ] ) ) ;
28 bb{ i } = transpose ( reshape (bb{ i } , [ n , n∗ r ] ) ) ;
29 aa{ i}=aa{ i } ( ( i −1)∗n+1: i ∗n , : ) ;
30 bb{ i}=bb{ i } ( ( i −1)∗n+1: i ∗n , : ) ;
31 end
32 i n t=ga l e shap l ey (n∗r ,A,B) ;%Computes i n t e g r a t e d marriage
33 seg=ze ro s (n , r ) ;
34 f o r i =1: r
35 seg ( : , i ) =(( i −1)∗n)+ga l e shap l ey (n , aa{ i}−n∗( i −1) ,bb{ i}−n∗( i
−1) ) ;%Computes s eg r egated marriage
36 end
37 seg=reshape ( seg , [ r∗n , 1 ] ) ;
38 match=cat (2 , int , seg ) ;%Who marr i e s whom in both s c ena r i o s ,
39 %Women 1 marr i e s guy in the 1 s t po s i t i on , and so on
40 i f match ( : , 1 )==match ( : , 2 )
41 x=0;
42 y=1
43 r e turn ;
44 end%Just in case everybody keeps t h e i r same match
45 i n d i c e s=f i n d ( ( match ( : , 1 ) ˜=match ( : , 2 ) ) ) ;%Women with d i f f e r e n t
partner
46 y=1+mean( match ( : , 1 )==match ( : , 2 ) ) ;%This g i v e s the value o f y
s t r a i g h t away
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47 sum=0;
48 SW=ze ro s ( s i z e ( i n d i c e s ) ) ;%Women who d i s l i k e i n t e g r a t i o n
49 f o r i =1: s i z e ( i n d i c e s ) ;
50 i f f i n d (B( i n d i c e s ( i ) , : )==i n t ( i n d i c e s ( i ) ) )>f i n d (B( i n d i c e s ( i
) , : )==seg ( i n d i c e s ( i ) ) ) ;
51 sum=sum+1;
52 SW( i )=i n d i c e s ( i ) ;
53 end
54 end
55 xx=seg ( i n d i c e s ) ;%Men with d i f f e r e n t par tne r s
56 SM=ze ro s ( s i z e ( xx ) ) ;%Men who d i s l i k e i n t e g r a t i o n
57 f o r i =1: s i z e ( xx )
58 i f f i n d (A( xx ( i ) , : )==f i n d ( i n t==xx ( i ) ) )>f i n d (A( xx ( i ) , : )==
f i n d ( seg==xx ( i ) ) ) ;
59 SM( i )=xx ( i ) ;
60 sum=sum+1;
61 end
62 end
63 SW(SW==0) = [ ] ; SM(SM==0) = [ ] ;
64 match ;
65 x=sum/(2∗n∗ r ) ;
66 SMP=ze ro s ( s i z e (SM, 1 ) ,1 ) ;SWP=ze ro s ( s i z e (SW, 1 ) ,1 ) ;%Average ranking
o f those who p r e f e r s e g r e g a t i o n
67 LOSSM=ze ro s ( s i z e (SM, 1 ) ,1 ) ;LOSSW=zero s ( s i z e (SW, 1 ) ,1 ) ;%Average
l o s s o f those who p r e f e r s e g r e g a t i o n
68 f o r i =1: s i z e (SM, 1 )
69 SMP( i )=mean( f i n d (B.’==SM( i ) ) −(0:( r∗n) : ( ( r∗n) ˆ2)−1) . ’ ) ;
70 j=SM( i ) ;
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71 LOSSM( i )=f i n d (A( j , : )==f i n d ( i n t==j ) )−f i n d (A( j , : )==f i n d ( seg==j
) ) ;
72 end
73 f o r i =1: s i z e (SW, 1 )
74 SWP( i )=mean( f i n d (B.’==SW( i ) ) −(0:( r∗n) : ( ( r∗n) ˆ2)−1) . ’ ) ;
75 j=SW( i ) ;
76 LOSSW( i )=f i n d (B( j , : )==i n t ( j ) )−f i n d (B( j , : )==seg ( j ) ) ;
77 end
78 SMP=mean(SMP) ; SWP=mean(SWP) ;
79 LOSSM=mean(LOSSM) ; LOSSW=mean(LOSSW) ;
80 end
81
82 −−−
83
84 f unc t i on [ e ] = i n t e g r a t i o n 1 0 ( t , n , r )
85 v=ze ro s ( t , 6 ) ;
86 pa r f o r i =1: t
87 [ x y SMP SWP LOSSM LOSSW]=march10 (n , r ) ;
88 v ( i , : ) =[x y SMP SWP LOSSM LOSSW] ;
89 end
90 e=sum(v , 1 ) / t ;
91 end
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Chapter 4
The Strength of the Weak Ties:
Online Integration via Online Dating
Abstract
We used to marry people to which we are somehow connected to: friends
of friends, coworkers, or colleagues from school. Since we are much more
connected to people that are like us, this implies that we were likely to marry
someone that share our own characteristics, in particular our race.
The irruption of online dating platforms have changed this pattern: other
online daters are very likely to be complete stranger to us. Given that one
third of modern marriages start online, we investigate theoretically the effects
of those previously absent ties in the diversity of modern societies.
We find that when a society benefits from previously absent ties, that we
interpret as online dating contacts, social integration occurs rapidly, even
if the number of partners met online is arbitrarily small. Our findings are
consistent with the sharp increase in interracial marriages in the U.S. after the
popularization of online dating platforms.
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In the most cited article on social networks,1 Granovetter (1973) argued that the most
important connections we have may not be our close friends but our acquaintances: people
that are not very close to us, either physically or emotionally, help us to relate to groups
that otherwise we would not be linked to. It is from acquaintances, for example, that
we are more likely to hear about job offers. Those weak ties serve as bridges between
our group of close friends and other clustered groups, hence allowing us to connect to the
global community in several ways.2
Interestingly, the process of how we meet our romantic partners in at least the last
hundred years closely resembles this phenomenon. We would probably not marry our
best friends, but we are likely to end up marrying a friend of a friend or someone we
coincided with in the past. Rosenfeld and Thomas (2012) show how Americans meet their
partners in the last decades, listed by importance: through mutual friends, in bars, at
work, in educational institutions, at church, through their families, or because they became
neighbors. This is nothing but the weak ties phenomenon in action.3
But in the last two decades, the way in which we meet our romantic partners has
changed dramatically. Online dating has become the second most popular way to meet a
spouse for most U.S. residents, as can be observed in Figure 4.1, taken from Rosenfeld
and Thomas (2012).4
The aforementioned article explains: “ the Internet increasingly allows Americans
to meet and form relationships with perfect strangers, that is, people with whom they
had no previous social tie”. We suspect that this is happening not only to Americans,
but is a consistent global phenomenon. If the reader needs another example, Figure 4.2
shows one of the author’s Facebook friends graph. The yellow triangles reveal previous
relationships that started in oﬄine venues. It can easily be seen that those ex-partners
had several mutual friends with the author; in the corresponding graph, their edge had
1“What are the most-cited publications in the social sciences according to Google?”, LSE Blog,
12/05/2016.
2Strong ties are also valuable, and in the case of job search, they may outweigh weak ones (Kramarz
and Skans, 2014; Gee et al., 2017).
3Backstrom and Kleinberg (2014) reinforce the previous point: given the social network of a Facebook
user who is in a romantic relationship, the node which has the highest chances to be his romantic partner
is, perhaps surprisingly, not the one who has more friends in common with him.
4We thank Michael Rosenfeld for allowing us to use his figure.
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Figure 4.1: How we met our partners in the last decades.
a high embeddedness in graph theoretical jargon. In contrast, nodes appearing as red
stars represent partners he met through online dating. It is easily seen that those have
no contacts in common with him, and thus it is likely that, if it would not have been for
online dating, those persons would have never interacted with him.
Because one-third of modern marriages start online (Cacioppo et al., 2013), and up
to 70% of homosexual relationships, the way we match online with potential partners
shapes the demography of our communities, in particular its racial diversity. Meeting
complete strangers online can intuitively increase the number of interracial marriages in
our societies, which is remarkably low: only 6.3% and 9% of the total number of marriages
are interracial in the U.S. and the U.K., respectively.5 The low rates of interracial marriage
are expected, given that in the U.S. it was illegal in 16 states 50 years ago, until the
Supreme Court ruled out anti-miscegenation laws in the famous Loving vs. Virginia case
(Arrow, 1998; Fryer, 2007).6
The research question that motivates us is to understand how many more interracial
marriages, if any, will occur after online dating becomes available in a society, and what
5“Interracial marriage: Who is marrying out”, Pew Research Center, 12/6/2015; and “What does the
2011 census tell us about inter-ethnic relationships?”, UK Office for National Statistics, 3/7/2014.
6Interracial marriage in the U.S. has increased considerably from 1970, but it is still rare (Kalmijn,
1998; Fryer, 2007; Furtado, 2015). Interracial marriage occurs far less frequently than interfaith marriages
(Qian, 1997).
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Figure 4.2: How one of us met his partners in the last decade.
drives this increase. In addition, we are also interested in whether marriages created online
are any different from those that existed before.
Understanding the evolution of interracial marriage is a relevant problem, for inter-
marriage is widely considered a measure of social distance in our societies (Wong, 2003;
Furtado, 2015), just like residential or school segregation. In the words of Fryer (2007),
“social intimacy is a way of measuring whether or not a majority group views a minority
group on equal footing”.
Moreover, the number of interracial marriages in a society has important economic
implications. Interracial marriage is known to affect the employment status7 (Meng and
Gregory, 2005; Goel and Lang, 2009; Furtado and Theodoropoulos, 2010) and the social
identity (Bisin and Verdier, 2000; Duncan and Trejo, 2011) of those engaging into it, as
well as the education levels of their offspring (Furtado, 2012).
4.0.1 Overview of Results
This article builds a theoretical framework to explain how many more interracial marriages
occur after the popularization of online dating. Our model builds an intuitive combination
7Intermarriage affects the probability of finding a job, but surprisingly, not the average wage earned
(Kantarevic, 2004).
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of non-transferable utility8 matching a` la Gale and Shapley (1962) in random graphs, first
studied by Erdo˝s and Re´nyi (1959) and Gilbert (1959). Our theoretical framework is easy
to grasp and has an intuitive graphical visualization.
We take several disjoint Gale-Shapley marriage problems, with agents randomly located
on the unit square. Agents want to marry the person who is closest to them, but they
can only marry people who they know, i.e. to whom they are connected. As in real life,
agents are highly connected with agents of their own race, but poorly so with people from
other races. Also, as it seems to be the case in real life,9 we assume that the marriages
that occur in our society are are those predicted by game-theoretic stability.
Then, to model online dating, we introduce absent ties, by slightly increasing the
probability that any two agents of different races are connected, and compare how many
more interracial marriages we observe now in the expanded society. We also keep an eye on
the characteristics of those newly formed marriages. In particular, we focus on the average
distance between partners before and after the introduction of online dating. Assuming
that marriages between partners who are closer to each other are stronger, given that they
are less susceptible to break up when new agents arrive, we can also measure whether
marriages created after online dating are more or less likely to divorce.
The graphical interpretation of our model is similar to the one used by the mathematics
literature in matching of Poisson point processes (Holroyd et al., 2009; Holroyd, 2011; Amir
et al., 2016), from which we borrow useful technical results (see the proof of Proposition
1). Our model also roughly resembles the graphical model of residential segregation of
Schelling (1969, 1971, 1972). However, unlike the famous Schelling model, our model
predicts that nearly complete racial integration occurs when online dating emerges, even if
the number of partners that individuals meet from newly formed ties is small.
We contrast our model with empirical data from U.S. and find that, as predicted, the
number of interracial marriages substantially increases after the popularization of online
8Most of the literature studying marriage with matching models uses transferable utility, following the
seminal work of Becker (1973, 1974, 1981). A review of that literature appears in Browning et al. (2014).
Although our model departs substantially from this literature, we point out similarities with particular
papers in this field when we detail the model in Section 4.1.
9See Banerjee et al. (2013), also Hitsch et al. (2010) for the case of online dates.
65
dating. We discuss how the observed sharp increase cannot be purely due to changes in
the composition of the U.S. population.
Our result contributes to clarify the relationship between social networks and interracial
marriage. In a related paper, Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2010) find that immigrants
who intermarry have a higher chance of finding employment than those who marry within
their own ethnic group. Interestingly, most of this effect is due to the valuable social
networks that immigrants gain by marrying a local (and not because an easier chance to
get a visa). In their model, intermarriage creates social networks. In ours, social networks
generate intermarriage, by creating previously absent ties within races via online dating.
This increase is not due to changes in agents’ preferences.
Our model also predicts that marriages created in a society with online dating should
be stronger, another feature that has been documented empirically.
4.0.2 Structure of the Article
We present our model in Section 1, and discuss the welfare measures we consider in Section
2. Sections 3 and 4 analyze how our welfare measures change when societies become more
connected using theory and computations, respectively.
Section 5 contrasts our model predictions with observed demographic trends from the
U.S. Section 6 concludes and details on other applications of our theoretical framework,
which is a general model of matching under network constraints. Those applications
include social integration after student participate in exchange programs and collaboration
between interdisciplinary researchers, among others.
4.1 Marriages in a Network
4.1.1 Agents
There are r races or communities, each with n heterosexual agents. Each race is assigned
a particular color. Each agent i is identified by a pair of coordinates (xi, yi) ∈ [0, 1]2, that
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can be understood as measures of agents’ social and political opinions,10 to which we refer
as personality traits. Both coordinates are drawn uniformly and independently for all
agents.11
Each agent is either male or female. Female agents are plotted as stars and males as
dots. Each race is balanced in its ratio between men and women.
4.1.2 Edges
Agents are connected to others of their own race with probability p: these edges are
represented as solid lines and occur independently of each other. Agents are connected to
others of different race with probability q: these interracial edges appear as dotted lines
and are also independent. We present an example in Figure 4.3.
Our model is a generalization of the random graph model (Erdo˝s and Re´nyi, 1959;
Gilbert, 1959; for a textbook reference, see Bolloba´s, 2001), in which there are r random
graphs with parameter p and n nodes, interacting across graphs with probability q. The
intuition in our model is that two agents are connected if they know each other. In
expectation, each agent is connected to n(r − 1)q + (n− 1)p persons.
A society S is a realization from a generalized random graph model, defined by a
four-tuple (n, r, p, q). A society S has a corresponding bipartite graph S = (M,W ;E)
where M and W are the set of men and women, respectively, and E is the set of edges.
We use the notation E(i, j) = 1 if there is an edge between agents i and j, and 0 otherwise.
We denote such edge by either (ij) or (ji).
10For a real-life representation using a 2-dimensional plane see www.politicalcompass.org. A similar
interpretation appears in Chiappori et al. (2012) and in Chiappori et al. (2016), in which the traits include
age, education, race, religion, weight or height.
11Another way to understand how agents’ personality traits are drawn is to consider a Poisson point
process (PPP) defined on the unit square with intensity λ = n. In a PPP the number of agents is not
fixed but drawn from a Poisson distribution, although there are n in expectation. In our case, the number
of agents is fixed throughout.
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Figure 4.3: 4 agents, 2 races, linked with p = 1 and q = 0.2.
4.1.3 Agents’ Preferences
All agents are heterosexual and prefer marrying anyone of different gender instead of
remaining alone.12 We denote by Pi the set of potential partners for i. The preferences
of agent i are given by a function δi : Pi → R+ that has a distance interpretation.13 An
agent i prefers agent j over agent k if δi(i, j) ≤ δi(i, k). The intuition is that agents like
potential partners that are close to them.
The function δi could be arbitrary, or could be the same for agents of the same race. It
could also be weighted to account for strong intraracial preferences that are often observed
in reality (Wong, 2003; Fisman et al., 2008; Hitsch et al., 2010; Rudder, 2014; Potarca
and Mills, 2015; McGrath et al., 2016).14 Inter or intraracial preferences can easily be
incorporated into the model, as in equation (4.3) below, but for ease of exposition and
12Heterosexuality is assumed for convenience, because it is well-known that in one-sided matching there
may be no stable pairings.
13Although δ can be generalized to include functions that violate the symmetry (δ(x, y) 6= δ(y, x)) and
identity (δ(x, x) = 0) characteristic properties of mathematical distances.
14It is not clear whether the declared intraracial preferences show an intrinsic intraracial predilection
or capture external biases, which, when removed, leave the partner indifferent to match across races.
Evidence supporting the latter hypothesis includes: Fryer (2007) documents that White and Black U.S.
veterans have had higher intermarry rates after serving with mixed communities. Fisman et al. (2008)
finds that people do not find partners of their own race more attractive. Rudder (2009) shows that online
daters have a roughly equal user compatibility. Lewis (2013) finds that users are more willing to engage
on interracial dating if they interacted earlier with a dater from another race.
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mathematical convenience (see Proposition 5) we only consider two intuitive and simple
functions that do not incorporate homophily.
The first one is the Euclidean distance for all agents, so that for any agent i and every
potential partner j 6= i,
δE(i, j) =
√
(xi − xj)2 + (yi − yj)2 (4.1)
and δE(i, i) =
√
2 ∀i ∈ M ∪W . Euclidean preferences are intuitive and have been
widely used in social science (Bogomolnaia and Laslier, 2007). The indifference curves
associated with Euclidean preferences can be described by balls around each point.
The second preferences we consider are such that every agent prefers a partner close to
them in personality trait x, but they all agree on which is the best in personality trait y.
The intuition is that the y-coordinate indicates something like attractiveness, wealth, or
any other attribute usually considered desirable by all partners. We call these preferences
assortative,15 so that for any agent i and every potential partner j 6= i,
δA(i, j) = |xi − xj|+ (1− yj) (4.2)
and δE(i, i) = 2 ∀i ∈M ∪W . The indifferences curves of assortative preferences are
depicted in Figure 4.4.
Both Euclidean and assortative preferences can be generalized by weighting them by
specific constants βij, such that
δ′i = βij δ(i, j) (4.3)
The constant βij captures intraracial specific preferences whenever it is constant for
all pairs i, j who belong to the same race. Similarly, it can capture specific reluctance to
match with agents from specific races whenever above 1.
A society in which all agents have either all Euclidean or all assortative preferences will
be called Euclidean or assortative, respectively. We focus on these two cases. In both cases
15If we keep the x-axis fixed, so that agents only care about the y-axis, we get full assortative mating
as a particular case.
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Figure 4.4: Indifference curves for assortative preferences (the blue star is the best partner
for the red dot).
agents’ preferences are strict because of our assumption on the distribution of personality
traits.
4.1.4 Marriages
Agents can only marry potential partners that they know: i.e. if between them and their
partner there exists a path of length at most k between them in the society graph.16 We
consider two types of marriages:
1. Direct marriages: k = 1. Agents can only marry if they know each other.
2. Long marriages: k = 2. Agents can only marry if they know each other or if they
have a mutual friend in common.
To formalize the previous marriage notion, let ρk(i, j) = 1 if there is a path of at most
length k between i and j, with the convention ρ1(i, i) = 1. A marriage µ : M∪W →M∪W
16A path from node i to t is a set of edges (ij), (jk), . . . , (st). The length of the path is the number of
such pairs.
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of length k is a function that satisfies
∀m ∈M µ(m) ∈ W ∪ {m} (4.4)
∀w ∈ W µ(w) ∈M ∪ {w} (4.5)
∀i ∈M ∪W µ(µ(i)) = i (4.6)
∀i ∈M ∪W µ(i) = j only if ρk(i, j) = 1 (4.7)
We use the convention that agents that remain unmarried are matched to themselves.
We use M∗ = {m ∈M | µ(m) ∈ W} to denote the set of all married men.
Because realized romantic pairings are close to those predicted by stability (Hitsch
et al., 2010; Banerjee et al., 2013), we assume that marriages that occur in each society
are stable. A marriage µ is k-stable if there is no man-woman pair (m,w) who are not
married to each other such that
ρk(m,w) = 1 (4.8)
δ(m,w) < δ(m,µ(m)) (4.9)
δ(w,m) < δ(w, µ(w)) (4.10)
Condition (4.8) is the only non-standard one that ensures that a pair of agents cannot
block a direct marriage if they are not connected in the corresponding graph, even if they
prefer each other to their respective partner. Given our assumptions regarding agents’
preferences,
Proposition 5. For any positive integer k, every Euclidean or assortative society has a
unique k-stable marriage.
Proof. For the Euclidean society, an easy algorithm computes the unique k-stable marriage.
Let every person point to their preferred partner to whom they are connected to by a
path of length at most k. In case two people point to each other, marry them and remove
them from the graph. Let everybody point to their new preferred partner to which they
are connected to among those still left. Again, marry those that choose each other, and
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repeat the procedure until no mutual pointing occurs. The procedure ends after at most
rn iterations. A similar algorithm has been suggested by Holroyd et al. (2009, Proposition
9) for 1-stable matchings.17
For the assortative society, assume by contradiction that there are two k-stable match-
ings µ and µ′ such that for two men m1 and m2, and two women w1 and w2, µ(w1) = w1 and
µ(w2) = w2, but µ
′(w1) = w2 and µ′(w2) = w1.18 The fact that both marriages are k-stable
implies, without loss of generality, that for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j, δ(mi, wi)−δ(mi, wj) < 0
and δ(wi,mj) − δ(wi,mi) < 0. Adding up those four inequalities, one obtains 0 < 0, a
contradiction. 
Figure 4.5 shows the direct and long stable marriages for the Euclidean and assortative
societies depicted in Figure 4.3.
(a) Direct marriage, Euclidean pref. (b) Long marriage, Euclidean pref.
(c) Direct marriage, assortative pref. (d) Long marriage, assortative pref.
Figure 4.5: Direct and long stable marriages for the assortative society in Fig. 4.3.
17Holroyd et al. (2009) require two additional properties: non-equidistance and no descending chains.
The first one is equivalent to strict preferences, the second one is trivially satisfied. In their algorithm,
agents point to the closest agent, independently if they are connected to them.
18It could be the case that in the two matchings there are no four people who change partner, but that
the swap involves more agents. The argument readily generalizes.
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4.1.5 Online Dating on Networks
We model online dating in a society S by increasing the number of interracial edges. Given
the bipartite graph S = (M,W ;E), we create new interracial edges between every pair
that is disconnected with a probability .19,20
S denotes a society that results after online dating has occurred in society S. S has
exactly the same nodes as S, and all its edges, but possibly more. We say that the society
S is an expansion of the society S.
4.2 Welfare Indicators
We want to understand how the welfare of a society changes after online dating becomes
available, i.e. after it becomes more interracially connected. There are three clear indicators
of agents’ welfare in a given society, namely its
1. Size, i.e. the total number of marriages in a society. Formally,
sz(S) = |M∗| (4.11)
2. Diversity, i.e. how close is the society to having the marriages produced in a completely
connected and colorblind society. We normalize this measure so that 0 indicates a society
with no interracial marriages, and 1 indicates a society in which r−1
r
of the marriages are
interracial. Note that it may well be the case that diversity is above 1.
Let R be a function that maps each agent to their race. Then
dv(S) =
|{m ∈M∗ | R(m) 6= R(µ(m))}|
sz(S)
· r
r − 1 (4.12)
19Online dating is likely to also increase the number of edges inside each race, but since we assume
that each race is already highly connected, these new edges play no role in the results of the model. We
perform robustness checks in Appendix 4.6.2, increasing both p and q but keeping its ratio fixed.
20We could assume that particular persons are more likely than others to use online dating, e.g. younger
people. Data shows that, from 2013 to 2015, the percentage of people who use online dating has increased
for people of all ages. See: “5 facts about online dating”, Pew Research Center, 29/2/2016. While this
occurs at a different rate, to obtain our main result we only need an infinitesimal increase in the probability
of interconnection for each agent.
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3. Strength, defined as
√
2 minus the average Euclidean distance between each married
couple, denoted as ds(S). A marriage with a small distance is better than one with a large
one because is less susceptible to break up when random agents appear on the unit square,
and the new outcome is to be k-stable too. The previous observation holds for assortative
societies too.
The above indicator is divided by
√
2 (or the maximal distance possible) to normalize it
between 0 and 1.
Formally,
ds(S) =
∑
m∈M∗ δ
E(m,µ(m))
sz(S)
(4.13)
st(S) =
√
2− ds(S)√
2
(4.14)
If every married agent gets paired with her perfect match, then st(S) = 1.
4.3 Edge Monotonicity of Welfare Indicators
Given a society S, the first question is whether the welfare indicators of a society grow
when its number of interracial edges grow, i.e. when online dating becomes available. We
refer to this property as edge monotonicity.21
Definition 2. A welfare indicator w is edge monotonic if, for any society S, and any of
its extensions S, we have
w(S) ≥ w(S) (4.15)
If a welfare indicator is edge monotonic it means that a society unambiguously becomes
better off from becoming more interracially connected. Unfortunately,
Proposition 6. Diversity, strength, and size are all not edge monotonic.
21Edge monotonicity is different from node monotonicity, in which one node, with all its corresponding
edges, is added to the matching problem. It is well-known that when a new man joins a stable matching
problem, every woman weakly improves, while every man becomes weakly worse off (Theorems 5 in Kelso
and Crawford, 1982, 2.25 and 2.26 in Roth and Sotomayor, 1992, and 1 and 2 in Crawford, 1991).
74
Before proving Proposition 6, let us build some intuition about it. It may be surprising
that the number of interracial marriages can decrease when more interracial edges are
formed. The intuition behind it is that an interracial edge may create one interracial
marriage at the cost of destroying two existing ones, and the left-alone partners may now
marry partners of their own race.
An interracial edge may similarly increase the average distance between couples if it
provides a link between very desirable partners, i.e. those in the center for the case of
Euclidean preferences. Those desirable partners drop their current spouses, which now
have to match with partners that have been dropped too. That their new partner has
been previously dropped implies it is far from the center, and thus the marriage between
dropped partners may marry people in the corners of the unit square.
Finally, size may be reduced if the new interracial edge links people who were already
highly connected in the society, making them leave partners who are poorly so. The
left-alone partners may now become unable to find a partner.
We present now a formal proof for Euclidean societies with direct marriages.
Proof. To show that size is not edge monotonic, consider the society in Figure 4.3 and its
direct stable matching in Figure 4.5a. Remove all interracial edges: it is immediate that
in the unique stable matching there are 4 couples now, one more than when interracial
edges are present.
For the case of strength, consider a simple society in which all nodes share the same
y-coordinate, as the one depicted in Figure 4.6. There are two intraracial marriages and
the average Euclidean distance is 3.5. When we add the interracial edge between the two
central nodes, the closest nodes marry and the two far away nodes marry too. The average
Euclidean distance in the expanded society increases to 4.5, hence reducing its strength.
Figure 4.6: Strength is not edge monotonic.
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To show that diversity is not edge monotonic, consider Figure 4.7. There are two
men and two women of each of two races a and b. Each gender is represented with the
superscript + or −.
(a) dv(S) = 2 (b) dv(S) = 1/3
Figure 4.7: Diversity is not edge monotonic.
Stability requires that µ(b−1 ) = a
+
1 and µ(b
+
2 ) = a
−
2 , and everyone else is unmarried.
However, when we add the edge (a+1 b
−
2 ), the married couples become µ(b
−
1 ) = b
+
1 , µ(a
+
2 ) =
a−1 , and µ(a
+
1 ) = b
−
2 . In this extended society, there is just one interracial marriage, out
of a total of three, when before we had two out of two. Therefore diversity reduces after
adding the edge (a+1 b
−
2 ). 
The failure of edge monotonicity by our three welfare measures makes evident that
to evaluate welfare changes in societies, we need to understand how welfare varies on an
average society after introducing new interracial edges. We develop this comparison in the
next Section.
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A final comment on edge monotonicity. The fact that the size of a society is not edge
monotonic, as shown in Proposition 6, implies that adding interracial edges may not lead
to a Pareto improvement of the society, i.e. some agents may become worse off after the
society becomes more connected. Nevertheless, the fraction that becomes worse off after
adding an extra edge never more than one-half of the society. Ortega (2017) discusses this
phenomenon in detail and the associated welfare losses of those hurt by integration.
4.4 Average Welfare Indicators
In the last Section we found that our three welfare indicators may increase or decrease
after adding interracial edges. Therefore, we need to analyze what happens in an average
case: i.e. what is expected to happen to the diversity, strength and size of a society when
agents become more connected.
There are two ways to answer this question. The first one is to provide analytical
expressions for the expected welfare indicators as a function of the number of interracial
edges. However, providing analytical solutions is incredibly complicated, if not impossible.
Already solving the expected average distance in a society with just one race containing
only one man and one woman requires a complicated computation (which equals to
2+
√
2+5 ln(
√
2+1)
15
≈ 0.52).22
The second way to approach the problem is to simulate several random societies and
observe how their welfare change when they become more connected. This is the route we
follow. We create ten thousand random societies, and increase the expected number of
interracial edges by increasing the parameter q. In the following subsections, we describe
the changes of our welfare indicators for different values of q.
In all cases we fix n = 50 and p = 1.23 We consider the following four scenarios:
1. Two races and direct marriages, appears in blue with diamond markers .
2. Five races and direct marriages, appears in grey with square markers .
22The detailed computation appears in “Distance between two random points in a square”, Mind your
Decisions, 3/6/2016.
23We limit ourselves to n = 50 and ten thousand replications because of computational limitations, even
though we used the high performance computing facilities at the University of Glasgow.
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3. Two races and long marriages, appears in orange with triangle markers N.
4. Five races and long marriages, appears in yellow with cross markers ×.
4.4.1 Diversity
In the case of long marriages, even the smallest increase in the probability of interracial
connections (in this case of 0.05) achieves perfect social integration with either two or
five races: diversity is exactly one. For the cases with direct marriages, the increase in
diversity is slower but still fast: an increase of q from 0 to 0.1 increases diversity to 0.19
for r = 2, and from 0 to 0.37 with r = 5.24
(a) Euclidean society. (b) Assortative society
Figure 4.8: Average diversity (y-axis) of a random society for different values of q.
The yellow and orange curves are indistinguishable in this plot because they are identical. Exact values and standard errors
(which are in the order of 1.0e-04) provided in Appendix 4.6.2.
Figure 4.8 summarizes our main result, namely
Result 1. Diversity is fully achieved with long marriages, even if the increase in interracial
connections is arbitrarily small.
With direct marriages, diversity is achieved partially but still substantially, so that
an increase in q always yields an increase in diversity of a larger size, i.e. diversity is a
concave function of q.
24Empirical evidence suggests that q is close to zero. Echenique and Fryer (2007) find that the typical
American public school student has 0.7 friends of another race. It is also a sensible assumption that p is
large, given the clear residential segregation patterns in the U.S. (Cutler et al., 1999) and that around
90% of people who attend religious services do so with others from their same race (Fryer, 2007).
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The intuition behind full diversity for the case of long marriages, in which agents are
allowed to marry any person with whom they have a friend in common, is that once an
agent obtains just one edge to any other race, he gains n
2
potential partners, i.e. just one
edge to a person of different race gives access to that person’s complete race.
The reader may think that the full diversity result heavily depends on each race being
fully connected, i.e. p = 1. This is not the case. Full diversity is also for many other values
of p, as we present in Appendix 4.6.2. When same-race agents are less interconnected
within themselves, agents gain fewer connections once an interracial edge is created, but
those fewer connections are relatively more valuable, because the agent had himself less
potential partners before the creation of new interracial edges.
Result 1 implies that, assuming long marriages are formed, very few interracial links
can lead a society to almost complete racial integration, and leads to very optimistic
views on the role that dating platforms can play in the reduction of racial segregation
in our society. Our result is in sharp contrast to the one of Schelling (1969, 1971) in its
well-known models of residential segregation, in which a society always gets completely
segregated.
What is the ingredient in our model that allows us to get predictions so different from
the ones derived from the celebrated Schelling’s model? It is not specific preferences, which
can be accommodated in our model so that an agent will slightly prefer her own race as
in Schelling’s (for example as a tie-breaker, an event of probability zero). It is not the
parameters of the society, which in both cases can be easily generalized (think for example
of nodes represented in Rn instead of R2). The whole difference, it would appear, is the
formation of romantic links. In our model, agents’ utility only depends on the location of
agent they marry, instead of depending on all their neighbors.
We pose this finding as the first testable hypothesis of our model
Hypothesis 1. The number of interracial marriages should increase after the populariza-
tion of online dating.
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4.4.2 Strength
A second observation, less pronounced that the increase in diversity, is that the strength of
the society goes up when increasing q. For an illustration, see Figure 4.9, which considers
the same four cases as before in both Euclidean and assortative societies.
(a) Euclidean society. (b) Assortative society
Figure 4.9: Average strength (y-axis) of a random society for different values of q.
Exact values and standard errors (which are in the order of 1.0e-04) provided in Appendix 4.6.2.
It is clear that, for all combinations of parameters (see Appendix 4.6.2 for further
robustness checks), there is a consistent trend downwards in the average distance of
partners after adding new interracial edges, and thus a consistent increase in strength of
the societies. We present this observation as our second result.
Result 2. Strength increases after the number of interracial edges increases. The increase
is faster whenever the society has more races, and converges to a higher level with long
marriages.
Assuming that marriages with a higher average distance have a higher chance to end
up divorcing, because they are more susceptible to break up when new nodes are added to
the society graph, we can reformulate our result as our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Marriages created in societies with online dating should have a lower
divorce rate.
Finally, our last welfare indicator, size, keeps constant for most of our simulations,
so we do not discuss it further. The detailed data behind Figures 4.8 and 4.9, with its
standard errors, appear in Appendix 4.6.2.
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Our analysis of the expected changes in welfare gives us with two testable hypotheses.
In the next Section, we contrast them against data on of interracial marriage in the U.S,
and the quality of the marriages created through online dating.
4.5 Hypotheses and Data
4.5.1 Hypothesis 1: More Interracial Marriages
What does the data reveal? Is our model consistent with observed demographic trends?
Figure 4.10 presents the evolution of interracial marriages among newlyweds in the U.S.
from 1967 to 2015, based on the 2008-2015 American Community Survey and 1980, 1990
and 2000 decennial censuses (IPUMS). In this Figure, interracial marriages include those
between white, black, Hispanic, Asian, American Indian or multiracial persons.25,26
In the data, we observe that the number of interracial marriages has consistently
increased in the last 50 years, as it has been documented by several other authors
(Kalmijn, 1998; Fryer, 2007; Furtado, 2015). However, it is intriguing that, shortly after
the introduction of the first dating websites in 1995, like Match.com, the percentage of
new marriages created by interracial couples increased rapidly. The increase becomes
steeper around 2004, when online dating became more popular: it is then when well-known
platforms such like OKCupid emerged. During the 2000’s decade, the percentage of new
marriages that are interracial changed from 10.68% to 15.54%, a huge increase of nearly
5%.
After the 2009 increase, the proportion of new interracial marriage jumps again in 2014
to 17.24%, remaining above 17% in 2015 too. Again, it is interesting that this increase
occurs shortly after the creation of Tinder, considered the most popular online dating app.
25We are grateful to Gretchen Livingston from the Pew Research Center for providing us with the
data. Data prior to 1980 are estimates. The methodology on how the data was collected is described in
Livingston and Brown (2017).
26Although Hispanic is not a race, Hispanics do not associate with other races. In the 2010 U.S. census,
over 19 million of Latinos selected to be of “some other race”. See “For many Latinos, racial identity is
more culture than color”, New York Times, 13/1/2012.
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Figure 4.10: Percentage of interracial marriages among newlyweds in the U.S.
Source: Pew Research Center analysis of 2008-2015 American Community Survey and 1980, 1990 and 2000 decennial
censuses (IPUMS). The red, green, and purple lines represent the creation of Match.com, OKCupid, and Tinder, three of
the largest dating websites. The blue line represents a prediction for 1996 – 2015 using the data from 1967 to 1995.
Tinder, created in 2012, has approximately 50 million users and produces more than 12
million matches per day.27
We do not claim that the increase in the share of new marriages that are interracial in
the last 20 years is a direct consequence of the emergence of online dating in the same
period, but this finding is in line with Hypothesis 1 in our model.
Another cause for the steep increase described could be that the U.S. population is
more interracial now than 20 years ago. The reduction of the percentage of Americans
who are white, falling from 80.3% to 72.4% from 1990 to 2010,28 combined with the fact
that white people are the ones who show higher reluctance to intermarriage (Livingston
and Brown, 2017, and even to date interracially, see Rudder, 2009), provides an alternative
explanation.
27“Tinder, the fast-growing dating app, taps an age-old truth”, New York Times, 29/10/2014. The
company claims that 36% of Facebook users have had an account on their platform.
28“Demographic trends in the 20th century”, and “The White Population: 2010 Census Briefs”, U.S.
Census Bureau.
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However, this explanation is inconsistent with the empirical observation that white
people are intermarrying more. By 1980, only 4% of the interracial newlyweds involved
white persons, while the percentage raised to 11% in 2015 (Livingston and Brown, 2017).
4.5.2 Hypothesis 2: Marriages Created Online Are Less Likely
to Divorce
Cacioppo et al. (2013) find that marriages created online were less likely to break up and
reveal a higher marital satisfaction, using a sample of 19,131 Americans who married
between 2005 and 2012. They write: “What is clear from this research is that a surprising
number of Americans now meet their spouse on-line, meeting a spouse on-line is on average
associated with slightly higher marital satisfaction and lower rates of marital break-up than
meeting a spouse through traditional (off-line) venues”.
The findings of Cacioppo and his coauthors show that our model predictions closely
match the observed properties of marriages created online, and its strength compared to
marriages created on other, more traditional venues.
Our model predicts that, on average, marriages created when online dating becomes
available last longer than those created in societies without this technology. Yet, it is
silent regarding comparisons between the strength of interracial and intraracial marriages.
There is empirical evidence showing that interracial marriages are more likely to end up in
divorce (Bratter and King, 2008; Zhang and Van Hook, 2009).
Our model is also silent on why some intraracial marriages from a particular race
last longer than intraracial marriages from another race (e.g. Stevenson and Wolfers,
2007 show that Blacks who divorce spend more time in their marriage than their White
counterparts).
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4.6 Final Remarks
4.6.1 Further Applications
The theoretical model we present discusses a general matching problem under network
constraints, and hence it can be useful to study other social phenomena besides interracial
marriage. The races or communities in our model can be understood as arbitrary groups of
highly clustered agents. Agents can be clustered by race, but also by ethnicity, education,
socieconomic status, religion, etcetera. Thus, our theoretical model can be also applied to
study interfaith marriages, or marriages between people of different social status.
The role of connecting highly clustered groups is also not only linked to online dating.
Another example is the European student exchange program “Erasmus”, which helped
more than 3 million students and over 350 thousand academics and staff members to
spend time at a University abroad.29
The matching of agents also goes beyond marriage. Think of nodes being researchers
at a University, races being academic departments, and edges represting who knows
whom. Matchings indicate academic collaboration in articles or grants. The Euclidean
distance interpretation makes sense, as a microeconomist in a business school may be
better off partnering with a game theorist at the biology department rather with an
econometrician in his own business school. Diversity in a University would be then a
measure for interdisciplinary research, often encouraged by higher education institutions
and funding bodies. Interdiscplinary seminars, for example, could take the role of creating
links between academics in different departments.
It would be interesting to test our model against in this other scenarios. We leave this
task for further research.
29“ERASMUS: Facts, figures and trends.”, European Comission, 10/6/2014.
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4.6.2 Conclusion
We introduce a simple theoretical model which tries to explain the complex process of
deciding whom to marry in the times of online dating. As any model, ours has limitations.
It categorizes every individual with only two characteristics, it assumes a very simple
structure inside each race, it poses restrictions on agents’ preferences. Furthermore, it fails
to capture many of the complex features of romance in social networks, like love. There
are multiple ways to enrich and complicate the model with more parameters.
However, the simplicity of our model is its main strength. With a basic structure, it
can generate very strong predictions: the diversity of societies, measured by the number
of interracial marriages in it, should increase drastically after the introduction of online
dating. And societies with online dating available should produce marriages that are less
likely to break up. Both predictions are consistent with observed demographic trends.
Simple models are great tools to convey an idea. Schelling’s segregation model clearly
does not capture many important components of how people decide where to live. It could
have been enhanced by introducing thousands of parameters. Yet it has broadened the
way how we understand racial segregation, and has been widely influential: according
to Google Scholar, it has been quoted 3,258 times by articles coming from sociology to
mathematics. It has provided us a way to think about an ubiquitous phenomenon.
Our model goes in the same direction.
Appendix A: Simulation Results
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Table 1: Supporting data for Figures 4.8 and 4.9
q 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
Panel A: Welfare on Euclidean societies
r = 2, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.10 0.19 0.27 0.34 0.41 0.47 0.57 0.66 0.75 0.82 0.89 0.94 1.00
St 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89
Sz 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 2, long marriages
Dv 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.89
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5,direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.22 0.37 0.47 0.56 0.62 0.68 0.77 0.83 0.88 0.92 0.95 0.98 1.00
St 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Sz 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5, long marriages
Dv 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Panel B: Welfare on assortative societies
r = 2, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.11 0.20 0.28 0.35 0.41 0.47 0.57 0.66 0.75 0.82 0.88 0.95 1.00
St 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Sz 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 2, long marriages
Dv 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5,direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.23 0.37 0.48 0.56 0.63 0.68 0.77 0.83 0.88 0.92 0.95 0.98 1.00
St 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.91
Sz 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5, long marriages
Dv 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.84 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
∗Average over 10,000 random simulations, n = 50, p = 1.
Sz equals the percentage of agents married.
Standard errors in the order of 1.0e-04, so we do not present them.
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Appendix B: Robustness Checks
In this Appendix we conduct several robustness checks to show that the fast increase in
the diversity of societies that we described in Result 1 occurs for many combinations of
parameters of the model.
The first exercise we perform is to conduct again 10,000 simulations as those supporting
Figures 4.8 and 4.9, but now changing the probability of intraracial connectivity p to 0.7,
0.5, and 0.3. We allow q to vary within 0 and p, as we have explained in the text that
q ≤ p, since persons tend to be more connected to people from their own race.
With respect to diversity, with long marriages we always observe an almost immediate
increase to 1, meaning complete social integration. This increase appears in Figure 11. As
expected, the increase becomes steeper as p increases.
With respect to strength, we also observe minor variations, which appear in Figure 12.
As expected, a smaller p makes agents less connected to potential partners, and thus the
strength of resulting marriages becomes weaker when agents are poorly connected. With
long marriages, strength converges quite quickly to its optimal value, around 0.9, which
again, is smaller in societies with low values of p and q.
The detailed results of our simulations with p equal to 0.7, 0.5, and 0.3 appear in
Tables 2, 3 and 4 at the end of this Appendix.
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(a) Euclidean society, p = .7. (b) Assortative society, p = .7
(c) Euclidean society, p = .5. (d) Assortative society, p = .5
(e) Euclidean society, p = .3. (f) Assortative society, p = .3
Figure 11: Average diversity (y-axis) of a random society for several values of p.
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(a) Euclidean society, p = .7. (b) Assortative society, p = .7
(c) Euclidean society, p = .5. (d) Assortative society, p = .5
(e) Euclidean society, p = .3. (f) Assortative society, p = .3
Figure 12: Average stregth (y-axis) of a random society for several values of p.
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The second robustness test we perform is to vary p and q simultaneously but keeping
its ratio fixed. Both parameters indicate how connected is a person to people of his race
compared to people of other races.
To find a good estimate of the ratio p
q
, we use data from the American Values Survey
by the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI), a nonpartisan, independent research
organization. The data is well described in the following article from the Washington Post:
“Three quarters of whites dont have any non-white friends”.
The PRRI data shows that, if a White American had 100 friends, 91 are expected to be
of his own race, and 1 Black, 1 Latino, and 1 Asian (the rest are multiracial or of unknown
race). Black Americans are more interracially connected, with 83 friends expected to be of
his own race, 8 Whites, 2 Latinos, and and no Asians.
Based on this data, we use the ratio p/q = 10, based on the ratio between the expected
number of Black and White friends for Black people. We vary p from 0 to 1. We present
the results for Euclidean societies only (as we have seen that Euclidean and assortative
societies produce almost identical results).
(a) Diversity. (b) Strength.
Figure 13: Average diversity and strength of a random society for p ∈ [0, 1].
A first conclusion we obtain is that, with long marriages, we again obtain complete
integration. However, this time is not as fast as with an increase of q alone. With direct
marriages the increase is again very fast but full integration is not obtained, only around
20% and 40% of it in societies with 2 and 5 races, respectively.
We could say that the diversity achieved when agents intra and interracial circles both
grow is much lower, compared to the results shown in the main text. But this lecture is
90
not accurate, because we are comparing the diversity to the one that obtains in a fully
connected society, i.e. a complete graph. Therefore, the diversity obtained already is
20% and 40% of the diversity in a complete graph, and that is a very high percentage of
interracial marriages, because we are fixing that agents are 10 times more connected to its
own race.
Finally, the strength levels we observe with direct marriages are the lowest we have
found so far, which is not a surprise given the small number of potential partners that
agents have when p is small. It is equally expected to observe that the strength of a society
increases when p grows.
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Table 2: Welfare with p = 0.7
q 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70
Panel A: Welfare on Euclidean societies
r = 2, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.35 0.44 0.52 0.59 0.72 0.83 0.92 1.00
St 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.88
Sz 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
r = 2, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.28 0.45 0.57 0.66 0.73 0.79 0.87 0.92 0.97 1.00
St 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.92
Sz 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00
r = 5, long marriages
Dv 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Panel B: Welfare on assortative societies
r = 2, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.14 0.25 0.35 0.44 0.52 0.59 0.72 0.83 0.92 1.00
St 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87
Sz 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
r = 2, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.28 0.45 0.57 0.66 0.73 0.79 0.87 0.93 0.97 1.00
St 0.83 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Sz 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
r = 5, long marriages
Dv 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.84 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
∗Average over 10,000 random simulations, n = 50.
Sz equals the percentage of agents married.
Standard errors in the order of 1.0e-04.
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Table 3: Welfare with p = 0.5
q 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.40 0.50
Panel A: Welfare on Euclidean societies
r = 2, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.17 0.32 0.45 0.56 0.66 0.74 0.89 1.00
St 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87
Sz 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98
r = 2, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.35 0.55 0.68 0.77 0.83 0.88 0.95 1.00
St 0.83 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.91
Sz 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99
r = 5, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Panel B: Welfare on assortative societies
r = 2, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.18 0.33 0.45 0.56 0.66 0.74 0.88 1.00
St 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.61
Sz 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98
r = 2, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.35 0.55 0.68 0.77 0.83 0.88 0.95 1.00
St 0.58 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.64
Sz 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
r = 5, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.84 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
∗Average over 10,000 random simulations, n = 50.
Sz equals the percentage of agents married.
Standard errors in the order of 1.0e-04.
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Table 4: Welfare with p = 0.3
q 0 0.05 1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
Panel A: Welfare on Euclidean societies
r = 2, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.27 0.49 0.66 0.80 0.90 1.00
St 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.85
Sz 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.95
r = 2, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.87 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.49 0.71 0.83 0.91 0.96 1.00
St 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
Sz 0.91 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98
r = 5, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Panel B: Welfare on assortative societies
r = 2, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.28 0.49 0.66 0.80 0.91 1.00
St 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.83
Sz 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.96
r = 2, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.87 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
r = 5, direct marriages
Dv 0.00 0.49 0.71 0.83 0.91 0.96 1.00
St 0.78 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.88
Sz 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98
r = 5, long marriages
Dv 0.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
St 0.84 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
Sz 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
∗Average over 10,000 random simulations, n = 50.
Sz equals the percentage of agents married.
Standard errors in the order of 1.0e-04.
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Table 5: Welfare with p
q
= 10
p 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Welfare on Euclidean societies
r = 2, direct marriages
0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19
0.75 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.87
r = 2, long marriages
0.75 0.87 0.91 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98
0.34 0.52 0.73 0.88 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.84 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
r = 5, direct marriages
0.91 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36
0.76 0.80 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.89
r = 5, long marriages
0.79 0.89 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98
0.60 0.76 0.90 0.96 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.87 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
0.94 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
∗Average over 10,000 random simulations, n = 50.
Sz equals the percentage of agents married.
Standard errors in the order of 1.0e-04.
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